


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JPRS-WER-87-013

26 FEBRUARY 1987

# West Europe Report

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JPRS-WER-87-013

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

- Tindemans on Problems of Belgian EC Presidency  
(Leo Tindemans Interview; LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 19 Dec 86) 1

BELGIUM

- De Donnea on Finances, Institutional Reform of Brussels  
(Francois-Xavier de Donnea Interview; LE SOIR, 10-  
11 Jan 87) ..... 12

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Paper Offers Pessimistic Assessment of FRG-Soviet Relations  
(Hans-Peter Riese; DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT,  
7 Dec 86) ..... 17

FRANCE

- Change in Right-Left Balance After Recent Elections Studied  
(Pierre Martin; REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE,  
Oct 86) ..... 21

- Giscard on Presidential Referendum, Cohabitation  
(LE FIGARO, 5 Jan 87) ..... 31

- Citizens' Interpretations of Political Power, Cohabitation  
(LE MONDE, 8 Jan 87) ..... 33

- PCF Delegation Gremetz, Leplat Visit Ethiopia  
(L'HUMANITE, 26 Dec 86) ..... 38

General Confederation of Labor Faces Serious Problems (Louis Vianey Interview; RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 15 Nov 86)	40
Citizen Views on Recent Strikes Examined (Charles Rebois; LE FIGARO, 13 Jan 87) .....	43
<b>GREECE</b>	
Briefs	
Aegean Ministry Appointment	50
<b>NETHERLANDS</b>	
Fortman, Beckers Debate Future of Radical Party (Gerard Driehuis, Tom-Jan Meeus; DE TIJD, 21 Nov 86) ....	51
Communist Party Congress Maintains Reformist Course (DE VOLKSKRANT, 8 Dec 86) .....	63
Kok's Actions as Labor Party Floor Leader Criticized (J. M. Bik; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 19 Dec 86) .....	65
<b>PORUGAL</b>	
More Active Relations With Former Colonies Advocated (Editorial; EXPRESSO, 13 Dec 86) .....	68
USSR Proposes Cooperation for Sao Tome Development (EXPRESSO, 13 Dec 86) .....	70
Azores Separatism Issue Causes Disbelief, Anger (Various sources, 21, 22 Nov 86) .....	72
Bio Data on FLA Leader	72
Alleged Military Implication	74
Relations With U.S., by Vicente Jorge Silva	75
FLA Leader's Motives Questioned	76
Commentary Views Hard Choices Facing PSD's Cavaco Silva (Pedro d'Anunciacao; EXPRESSO, 13 Dec 86) .....	78
<b>SPAIN</b>	
Poll Results on Stance Vis-a-Vis Economy, Political Situation (EL PAIS, 4 Jan 87) .....	81
<b>ECONOMIC</b>	
<b>BELGIUM</b>	
Budget for 1986 Shows Smaller Deficit Than Expected (LE SOIR, 8, 9 Jan 87) .....	89

Figures on Budget, by Guy Duplat Flemish Socialists' Criticisms	89 90
GREECE	
Briefs	
Cooperation With CSSR	92
MILITARY	
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	
Attitudes Shifting on Conscientious Objection, Allied Basing (EMNID INFORMATIONEN, No 8-9, 1986) .....	93
FRANCE	
Giraud, Dassault Conflict Touches Mirage-2000, Rafale (Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 20 Dec 86) .....	96
Isnard Views Pros, Cons of AWACS Purchase (Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 20 Dec 86) .....	99
NETHERLANDS	
MLRS Units Enter Service With I Corps Artillery (J. R. Gramsma; ALLE HENS, Dec 86) .....	101
SWEDEN	
Increased Defense Effort in Vulnerable Norrland Analyzed (Volker Skierka; SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 3 Jan 87) .....	104

/9987

## TINDEMANS ON PROBLEMS OF BELGIAN EC PRESIDENCY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 19 Dec 86 pp 2-3

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Relations Leo Tindemans; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The implementation of the "Single Act," reform of joint farm policy, assurance of community cohesion through more efficient structural funds, and the reworking of Community financing from A to Z. In this "package" of basic problems which the Belgian presidency will have to deal with in the course of the next 6 months, what are your priorities?

[Answer] When one analyzes coldly what Belgium faces, one could despair! One might almost even hope just to be able to survive the presidential term.

More seriously, it is necessary first of all to remember that a country which is given the presidency of the Community Council is not the same as a national government which goes to the parliament to announce what it really plans. The ingenious aspect of the Treaty of Rome is that it establishes a distribution of responsibilities between the Commission, which proposes, and the Council, which disposes. Naturally, Belgium will await the proposals of the Commission, and its responsibility will be to carry them forward properly within the jurisdiction over which it presides, in the same way as the Council of Ministers deals. It is only if the Commission fails to act that the Belgian presidency might be led to make suggestions.

As to the implementation of the Single Act with the "domestic market" in view, the Belgian presidency will do everything possible to advance matters, so that a "package" of measures will be adopted by The Twelve. But to get a grasp on the "Delors package"--such questions as what community resources? What farm policy reform? How can the cohesion of The Twelve be ensured--here the proposals of the Commission will be absolutely indispensable. Now, it will be necessary to wait until the tour of the capital cities the European Council in London has invited Jacques Delors to make is completed.

[Question] Do you have doubts that Europe can have a "rendezvous with itself" during the Belgian presidency?

[Answer] This process will inevitably begin during our presidency.

[Question] Will this be, in your opinion, with emphasis on the problem which underlies all the others--the exhaustion of the Community's own resources?

[Answer] This cannot be avoided. Toward the middle of next year, all of the financial resources will have been used up. This will mean bankruptcy pure and simple unless a solution is found before then. The Belgian presidency cannot get around that reality.

[Question] Based on all of the problems which exist, doesn't it emerge ever more clearly that certain among The Twelve have a very limited vision of the Europe to be built, and that a simple free exchange zone is more appealing to them than a veritable "community"? Do the Belgian presidency and the Commission have the means of combating this possible distortion?

[Answer] Perhaps not the means, but a good supply of ideas based on respect for the underlying principles of the Community. However, because it was drafted after the crisis provoked by the European Defense Community, the key document, the Treaty of Rome, is somewhat ambiguous where the political goal in European construction is concerned. It is for this reason that different concepts are being expressed today.

The Twelve are moving ahead, but without a compass! By means of the Single Act, they modified the Treaty by adding certain things to it. This document, the honorable result of negotiations, cannot serve as a basis for Community action in the coming 30 years. But if it is applied as a whole, which the Belgian presidency will oversee, it will be possible to take a major step toward our eternal dream.

[Question] Its implementation without reservation would still be necessary. Now, since we know that certain member nations want to formalize the "right of veto" through the Single Act, isn't there a danger that the opposite result--a step backward--will be achieved?

[Answer] This unhappy thought did not begin with the Single Act. I will never be led to approve of the "Luxembourg compromise," but I cannot prevent others from invoking it. However, the danger it represents is less today than 10 years ago. The Twelve are casting ever increasing numbers of votes! In 1982, Belgium was praised for having forced a vote on farm prices despite the British objections. Later, other countries, including Great Britain, also insisted on votes, even when the matters in question were delicate ones.

[Question] The Single Act also calls for an extension of the authority of the European Parliament. How do you plan to utilize this potential?

[Answer] Belgium would like to go farther than the Single Act provides. It is necessary to give the Parliament a political reason for being. Because of its election by direct universal suffrage, it cannot have mere consultative powers.

On this level, the Single Act will not allow a spectacular advance. On the contrary, the two readings for which it provides might lead to conflict. As the Parliament will not have the right to amend the texts submitted to it,

rejection of them will be its sole weapon. In short, the Single Act might push it toward radicalism. This is why it would be well for the Council and the Parliament to tune their violins to the same pitch and adopt the working methods which contribute to dialogue.

[Question] Will the Belgian presidency be homogeneous? During the European Council in London, Mr Martens and you yourself indicated that Belgium supported the 7.7 billion ECUs demanded by the Commission for "the technological Europe." In Brussels a few days later, Mr Verfostadt said that he could be happy with 6 billion. Isn't there a contradiction here which, if it were to be renewed in the course of the next 6 months, might prove very awkward?

[Answer] The government officials must still reach agreement, which they will do in the course of a special meeting. For the time being, the ministers, the members of their staffs and news commentators, if one is to believe certain press organs, do not grasp the significance of the presidency or of the European Community in general. From a reading of their articles, it seems that Belgium should do this, Belgium should do that--as if it could change the world because it occupies the presidency!

In reality, the presidency will only have jurisdiction over the matters specified in the Treaty. An informal Council meeting can decide nothing and does not have the benefit of any Community preparation. Moreover, the "general" Council, made up of the ministers of foreign affairs, "covers" all of the sectors which the formal councils do not. Those who believe that Belgium can get any specific decision adopted are sadly mistaken!

All of this means that government agreement is essential, such that each Belgian minister dealing with the Community will speak the same language. The government must develop a single point of view.

[Question] In London, you also indicated that the chiefs of state and the government had dared for the first time to raise the question of what kind of defense we want for Europe. Do you have the feeling that there is movement toward undertakings in this sector?

[Answer] No. The Single Act includes a chapter devoted to "political cooperation" in connection with the political and economic aspects of security. The military aspects are excluded. The European Community thus has no jurisdiction in the realm of defense. But one cannot prevent the heads of government from discussing security in Europe after Reykjavik. And this will be discussed in terms of "political cooperation," but without going into the details of military technique. Without any doubt there will be talk of nuclear weapons, intermediary or short-range missiles, but the decisions will be adopted on the level of NATO.

[Question] Along the same line of thinking, do you believe that the Union of Western Europe (UEO) can achieve the revitalization its members wish to impose on it?

[Answer] Yes. Belgium believes it can. Since the Reykjavik meeting, everyone in Europe wants to participate in the UEO and to discuss security. And this is particularly remarkable since the same phenomenon was noted after the Stockholm Conference. The moment an agreement between the United States and the USSR, or rather between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was outlined, the neutral and nonaligned nations voiced their concern. They raised the problem of their security with us.

In the same way, after the Reykjavik meeting, the Europeans rediscovered the problem of "their" security. And suddenly they turned to the UEO. Since then we have had a meeting (editor's note--of foreign affairs ministers), the best that we have ever had, some say. One of my colleagues expressed the view, at the end of the sessions, that if the UEO had not existed, it would be necessary to invent it now. In short, the potential of the UEO has just been discovered. There have been, moreover, applications for membership.

[Question] This awakening of awareness of security problems in certain countries--isn't it the result of the fact that during the Reykjavik summit meeting, the United States paid very little attention to the thinking of its allies on these matters?

[Answer] Thus far we have always had good dialogue, although the United States has sometimes had occasion to complain about the weakness of the European pillar of the Alliance. I would mention by way of proof that just after the Reykjavik meeting, Mr Shultz went immediately to Brussels. On that occasion, there was ample opportunity to assess European ideas.

That having been said, Reykjavik did not in my opinion set a good example of diplomatic techniques or methods. It is true that it is easy to criticize after the fact, but in my view, Mr Gorbachev should have been told that his proposals were surprising and should have been asked for 2 months in which to analyze them before giving him any answers about a summit meeting in Washington. In fact, the West let itself be caught up in the process of negotiations improvised on the spot.

Since then, the European peoples have realized that an agreement is not excluded. As a result, they are wondering what they should do with a view to their security, what they should accept and what they should reject.

[Question] Was this development of awareness the product of the fact that the Americans, at least on two issues--the zero option and SALT II--ignored the recommendations or the requests of the Europeans?

[Answer] Where the zero option is concerned, it must be remembered that the Europeans are divided. Unlike certain of its partners, Belgium accepts this proposal. It understands the risks which the removal of the Euromissiles would involve, and therefore the issue of conventional weapons, directly linked with them, must be negotiated simultaneously. It would be well, for example, to allow 6 months for talks. I have heard Richard Perle himself put forth this sort of argument. We believe that problems should not be accumulated, because this leads to the risk of being unable to achieve results.

[Question] And what about SALT II?

[Answer] We have always urged the Americans not to violate the agreement. The response we have received from Washington included a guarantee that nothing would be done in this connection before the end of the year. We have reached the end of the year. We believe, however, that it is necessary (for both sides) to respect this treaty until such time as an agreement is reached by the two great powers on the Start weapons.

[Question] Since the Reykjavik summit, one could say that the situation is at a standstill, so to speak, following the "link" established by the USSR among the various issues being negotiated in Geneva. Do you think that it will be possible for you in the presidency of the Community to play a role in freeing up negotiations, somewhat like what Chancellor Schmidt succeeded in doing at the beginning of the decade, thanks to a trip he made to Moscow when the negotiations on the Euromissiles had reached (already) an impasse?

[Answer] This is not within the jurisdiction of the Community. But if the opportunity arose for me to visit Moscow under the proper conditions, I would not fail to take up this problem. If only on behalf of Belgium. And if my colleagues were to allow me to do so on behalf of The Twelve--with the reservation that Ireland's neutral status must be respected--so much the better!

I told Messrs Shultz and Shevardnadze that I did not understand the link established by the Soviets with the Strategic Defense Initiative, because it is linked in fact with the ABM Treaty (on antiballistic missiles) which both the United States and the USSR have approved. I added that each was accusing the other of violating the ABM Treaty, which authorizes tests, but only in the laboratory, but without ever defining what testing in the laboratory is. Therefore, I said to them, for goodness' sake concentrate your efforts on the interpretation of the treaty. If you can reach agreement on this interpretation during the study period, the path will naturally be cleared toward very major solutions in the spirit of the Reykjavik meeting.

I repeat this constantly, for it is my profound conviction. The ABM Treaty is a condition for all the rest.

[Question] Do you have the feeling that a policy of little steps might lead to negotiations in Geneva?

[Answer] It is fortunate that the Geneva forum exists, or otherwise, following the Reykjavik meeting, dialogue would no longer be possible. The Soviet position has hardened. The Kremlin is demanding that there be agreement on everything, or there will be none on anything. The Americans are analyzing the situation. The Europeans are drawing together. I do not wish to say that either the one or the other is right. I believe that on both sides, there is a desire to reduce armaments, but there is awareness, on our side, in any case, that disarmament which is not carried out intelligently could increase the risk of war.

Beneath an apparent contradiction, there is a profound truth. If we were to return tomorrow to a situation like that in the prenuclear era, the conditions which led to war would again exist. What we must therefore do is define a new concept, in order to prevent any threat of war in the future. On this point, which involves guaranteeing our security while disarming, we in the West are not as yet in full agreement. The great debate on this aspect of the matter must be undertaken now.

[Question] At the beginning of the autumn, it was a question of a major Belgian undertaking oriented toward the socialist countries. Apparently this has not as yet been implemented. Will it be, under your presidency?

[Answer] Belgium has undertaken two things. I will not discuss them, but I can tell you that they led to a major disappointment. We saw that no response was forthcoming. What Belgium proposed was immediately submitted to the superpowers. Which means that, whatever proposal is submitted by a country to a partner in the other camp, there will be no response without the agreement of the great powers. What purpose does it serve then to plunge into such an operation?

You will excuse me, for I cannot mention the country, but this was the disappointment of my life. International policy remains dominated by strength and power. This is a reality. One's dimensions are well-known. Remember Stalin's questions: "What is the Vatican? How many divisions has the Pope?"

[Question] You are going to the United States during the month of January. What are the issues you will stress the most?

[Answer] I will seek to understand the American point of view on the Community program. I will raise the problem of relations with the United States on the trade level and in the farm sector. Then it will be a question of the difficulties encountered on other continents, in particular Central America, southern Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

[Question] Won't the decline in the credibility of the United States in the Arab countries following the sales of American weapons to Iran provide an opportunity for the European Community to launch new undertakings?

[Answer] The serious thing today is that there is no talk of any initiative concerning which one could attempt to achieve a consensus. There are some who talk of a great international conference, while others do not want even to hear of it, but no one is mentioning the Reagan proposals, or the Fes or Camp David principles. One does not know which way to proceed.

[Question] Yes, but what can be done?

[Answer] I note, in fact, that the discoveries about the deliveries of weapons to Iran have undermined the credibility of the United States in the Arab countries. On all sides we are told that if Europe were to speak now, it would be heard attentively and its prestige would even emerge increased. And even the United States, some say, would be happy to approve the European path under the present conditions. This is what is being explored today.

[Question] Hasn't the Venice declaration been outdated by events, in particular where the representative nature of the PLO is concerned? You met with Mr Kaddoumi, the "minister of foreign affairs" of the PLO, a few days ago. Does that organization still represent the Palestinians?

[Answer] There is undeniably a problem concerning the representation of the Palestinians. I have always believed that a combination of Reagan's proposals for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation and the Fes principles, in accordance with which the Arab countries would recognize the state of Israel, should suffice to provide a basis for negotiation. But there is no longer any discussion of the Reagan proposals on the American side, while the Arab world is divided on the subject of implementing the Fes principles.

If a movement in defense of these principles and with them, the representation of the Palestinians, on the other side of the Atlantic as well as in Europe, were visible on the Arab side, more attention would be paid to the search for a solution taking these principles into account. In order to negotiate, one must have interlocutors.

[Question] Are you not thus issuing an appeal to the Arab countries, saying "Reach agreement, and then we will give you a hand"?

[Answer] I would not like to state it so directly. But you know very well how quickly the situation develops. Look at Lebanon.

[Question] Do you plan to have contact with Iran, the country which keeps the score in the Middle East?

[Answer] The Arab ambassadors to Brussels have asked me specifically to concern myself with this interminable war between Iraq and Iran. My first reaction was to wonder how Belgium could be expected to succeed where the Arab states have thus far failed. Having made that clear, I am ready to do what I can. But I do not want to embark upon useless processes, either.

[Question] Concerning southern Africa at present, can the European Community do something about the drama developing there?

[Answer] The likes of Botha have not, unfortunately, understood the mission entrusted to Sir Geoffrey Howe by The Twelve at all. Nor have the others. Bishop Tutu refused to meet with the head of the British diplomatic mission. That having been said, I believe that contact with the Front Line countries is inevitable, in order to find out how they view matters.

Are talks with South Africa necessary? I do not yet dare say. But I exclude nothing. Be that as it may, it is true that a drama is developing. A delegation of "liberal" South African whites came to tell me that their choice is between disaster and an unknown future. On the one hand there is a whole

These white South Africans said they were convinced that with proper dialogue involving all the political forces, the intelligent elements can reach an understanding and can find a centrist solution. But first it is necessary to get the interlocutors together, and the South African government opposes this.

[Question] Another burning issue is Central America. What change will the Belgian presidency mean for this region? More specifically, what are the proposals which will be put forth at the meeting in Guatemala City in February?

[Answer] At the outset, I would like to say that I have many friends in Latin America. I taught in Caracas, Venezuela, when I was young. I was president of the European Popular Party and therefore I was in touch with my party colleagues in Latin America. My best friend, Aristides Calvani, was unfortunately killed in an airplane accident. Duarte is a personal friend, and I have never been ashamed to say so. Even when he was under attack, I always defended him.

I believe therefore that the Belgian presidency will be welcomed. Having said that, the meeting in Guatemala City will be the third, following those in San Jose and Luxembourg, between representatives of the Community and a terrorized region which is socially and economically exhausted. People always say that the political situation there is bad because the social situation is bad. And the social situation is bad because the economic situation is bad. Thus Europe cannot content itself with fine political statements, although these are important. For the people there, hearing the voice of Europe and knowing that they are not forgotten are important. But that is not enough.

We should be able to contribute concrete aid. For my part, I have already spoken to Commissioner Cheyson and Delors about it. Does the Commission still have the means and can it develop a program, possibly in combination with bilateral undertakings by member nations, with regard to Central America, in order to be able to present something on the occasion of this third meeting? Delors and Cheyson told me that they would study the problem and would see if there might not be a means of doing something.

I want to motivate my colleagues. We cannot go there simply to repeat what was said earlier in San Jose or Luxembourg. Specific proposals are necessary.

[Question] Is there a movement toward developing cooperation or trade?

[Answer] Doubtless both. One cannot be done without the other, because providing a country with aid for development without its being able to sell its products accomplishes nothing.

[Question] After the first meeting in San Jose, the EEC promised aid for the entire region. As soon as the meeting had ended, the United States promised more for Costa Rica alone. What then can really be done?

[Answer] Here it is the Community budget problem.

[Question] But what remains as a real possibility for aiding Latin American when we know that the Community has separate agreements with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific?

[Answer] This is a question we are always asked in international circles. We are reproached about Yaounde and Lome and we are told: "You established a preferential system favoring certain countries and you are neglecting all the others." This is true, but it has to do with the origin of this Yaounde agreement, and that in Lome later.

Decolonization came to an end and European construction was under way, but the member nations felt an obligation with regard to their former colonies. At the beginning, however, only the French-speaking former colonies were involved, because Great Britain was not a member of the EEC. Then, little by little, the circle widened. The countries benefiting from these priorities are known. And our aid was limited to them. We are often criticized for this "discriminatory" policy.

[Question] What is your view on this subject?

[Answer] If you cannot help everyone, you must be selective. This is what Europe has done.

[Question] Within the Third World precisely, there is a vast continent--Asia. At present, the USSR is making a tremendous effort in that direction. Isn't Europe in danger of losing further ground there?

[Answer] Few European countries have had links with Asia--England, France and the Netherlands. Europe as such has never looked toward Asia very much. But it should be noted that this continent represents the future of the world. Last year, the trade relations of the United States with Asia were more substantial than those with the European Community. That shows how the world is changing.

Prior to the Reagan presidency, American political circles were inclined to look toward Europe. Today, if they open their windows, the view is toward the Pacific. Even industry is being installed on the West Coast. In Europe this change is not being taken into full account, nor are the dynamism and the intelligence evidenced in those countries. The group of countries with the highest rate of growth in the world is the ASEAN group.

And what of Japan? Some believe that it has surpassed the United States. Its political cohesion and determined will justify its highest hopes. As to China, which is opening up--it represents a billion consumers. And India, despite its great poverty, has an impressive stratum of intellectuals and scholars. This whole world is moving and developing, and yet Europe is not doing much for it.

[Question] Again it is a problem of resources.

[Answer] Here as well. But in Asia, it is not a question of contributing economic aid, but rather of signing agreements beneficial to both parties.

[Question] In recent times, Switzerland has shown interest in membership in the Common Market. What is your position on this?

[Answer] I like Switzerland very much. And if Bern files an application, it should be seriously studied. That having been said, we in Europe must know that if there are more members, unity becomes more difficult and the decision-making process much more complicated. It was easier to decide with six than it is with 12.

We must consider what it is we want. And from this point of view, we must discuss the nature of the goal about which we speak to all the partners, because from time to time the concept of a two-speed Europe is brought up again. Do all of the member nations agree to the same concept of European union, from both the economic and the political points of view? Europe cannot continue to tolerate ambiguity.

[Question] Aren't you afraid you might receive an application for membership from Turkey?

[Answer] That an application might be made would be normal. In Morocco as well, there are people who hope that their country will become a member of the Community. Those who have a clear concept of Europe should simply say to them: "If you accept all of this, you are welcome." But I am sometimes concerned now when I hear interpretations which would make the "fathers of Europe" shudder.

[Question] Do you think that The Twelve will succeed in reaching full agreement on the conditions to be imposed on the candidates?

[Answer] You are asking me a puzzler! I might ask you in return why this was not done when the means were available. There indeed lies the fault!

[Question] And will this question be taken up soon?

[Answer] If it is not, European construction is doomed to collapse, or at least to become something else! With the "domestic market" and its 320 million consumers, the plan is to create something fantastic, much larger than the American market. But if the policies do not serve to implement this scheme, we will have a kind of vast free-exchange zone. And how long can Europe be viable without a consistent monetary system, without joint policies in certain sectors?

Let us take the case of technology, which will in large part determine the future. If certain nations do not want to provide more than 3 billion ECUs for the basic program, which is less than the effort made up to the present, it is, among other things, because they believe that it will be more profitable for them to act alone than to work together with The Twelve. Now without a joint policy on research and technology, there can be no European union! The basic question will inevitably and immediately arise: "What is wanted?"

[Question] In the event that an increasingly clear split develops among The Twelve between the advocates of a veritable community and the supporters of a mere free-exchange zone, have you already contemplated some fallback position?

[Answer] Thus far, isolationism has appealed to no one. None of the member nations wants to leave the Community. During the European Council meeting in Milan, three countries were fiercely opposed to the idea of convoking an "intergovernmental conference." Today, all of them wanted their parliaments to approve the Single Act. Thus even if it is reluctantly, they are following development. Your question will only be pertinent on the day one of them no longer wants to follow suit.

[Question] In any case, won't the solution involve, one day or another, the creation of a "two-speed Europe," with a hard integrationist nucleus?

[Answer] This tendency was seen prior to the European Council meetings in Fontainebleau and Milan. There were those who obviously wanted to expose the forces desirous of moving forward and the others. As we succeeded in settling the problem of the British contribution and reaching agreement on the Single Act, I do not foresee anything more of this sort for the time being. But from that to claiming that the idea has disappeared from people's minds entirely...

[Question] Has it disappeared from yours?

[Answer] I have a concept of Europe which leads from time to time to disappointments. If the day comes when the treaties are no longer accepted by everyone, or are subject to new interpretations, I would then prefer to advocate a body which functions and is made up of nations which know what they want, rather than "floating" from day to day and risking disappearance, just as the Holy Alliance and so many other 19th century proposals based on the intergovernmental principle disappeared. I reject such a development because it would lead to the disintegration and, naturally, the decadence of Europe.

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CSO:3619/22

## DE DONNEA ON FINANCES, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF BRUSSELS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 10/11 Jan 87 p 2

[Interview with Francois-Xavier de Donnea, minister of the Brussels region, by Guy Duplat and Michelle Lamensch; date and place not given: "With the Brussels Accord, Dialog Again Becomes Possible"]

[Text] The minister of the Brussels region is obviously satisfied with the Saint-Sylvestre agreement which, he says, does not at all mortgage Brussels' definitive status, called for by the French speaking population, and which, moreover, releases inheritance taxes for the capital. De Donnea states that, before the end of March, the 1986 inheritance taxes and the first portion of the 1987 taxes should actually be entering the coffers of the region. This money will of course help the communes, but it will also be used for "coup de poing" (literally, fisticuff) urban renewal operations."

[Question] The Saint-Sylvester agreement anticipates the release of 2.4 billion in inheritance taxes for Brussels. But this money is not yet in your coffers...

[Answer] True. The 1986 inheritance taxes will arrive when the budget of the region will have been voted on in the two chambers, that is, toward the end of February. Part of the 1987 taxes will probably be paid at the beginning of March, when the first interim loans of the year will have been voted.

[Question] How will you divide this so long-awaited manna?

[Answer] The communes will receive 1.75 billion francs to alleviate their loan obligations (900 million) and to increase the subsidy capital of the communes. The balance, that is, 650 million, will be used for urban and industrial renewal. In 1987 and the following years, the inheritance taxes will probably be distributed in like manner.

[Question] Brussels indeed does need renewal to attract people...

[Answer] Yes. This renewal is very important for the city's image, but also, for example, for the improvement of immigrant districts. Brussels must become more attractive as an international city. I might add that the

increase in value of real estate property in Brussels will attract people, and consequently there will be an increase in the financial receipts of the communes.

Renewal: "Fisticuff" Operations

[Question] How will you use the annual 650 million for renewal?

[Answer] We will not increase subsidies. We want to organize some district renewal "coup de poing" operations--quite visible operations that will link the communes that are concerned with the private sector. Several projects are in view, such as improved approaches for the Midi Railroad Station. A research group is presently studying this matter.

[Question] Let us get to the matter of the Saint-Sylvestre agreements. It is foreseen, for example, that the communes might transfer some jurisdictions in the matter of education or culture (museums, cultural centers, etc.) to the Cultural Commissions of the communities. But the French community, for example, has hardly any money to finance that.

[Answer] We chose this possible transfer to the Cultural Commissions so that these jurisdictions could continue to be administered by the people of Brussels. But it is clear that these transfers will have to be negotiated. Agreements will be necessary between the Cultural Commissions and the communes concerned. And we will have to negotiate the financial aspects with the communities. It is also possible that these transfers will be operated chiefly by the Flemish side.

Union? Not At Present

[Question] It is not a question of a union of communes, contrary to the desire of the Minister of Interior, who wanted to unite Brussels, Saint-Gilles, Etterbeek, and Saint-Josse, but contrary also to the desire of the Flemish...

[Answer] The moment has not arrived for union. The dossier is not ready. The marriage of a blind person and a paralytic has never been a good solution. First of all, one must improve the finances of the communes and of the agglomeration. It will also be necessary to draw up a balance sheet of the mergers of communes that have already been effected in the country to analyze if they have truly resulted in savings and have provided better services to the citizens. Of course, another thing must be considered; that is, whether we should revise certain aberrations in the matter of communal borders with Brussels, or whether, as is our intention, we should provide for better coordination of communal police services.

[Question] Does the fact that a policeman of a commune who is killed by someone in another entity, or the fact that some Brussels arterial roads are hard to manage on the pretence that they come under the jurisdiction of three different communes, argue for administrative adjustments?

[Answer] Of course. And we can, as provided in our plan, pool some departments, which has already be done in the case of the Brussels Sewer Department, or as could be done in the matter of school lunches.

[Question] But, whatever happens, you will always have 19 burgomasters who, for personal reasons, will have conflicting opinions regarding the mergers?

[Answer] I do not think so. Some envision it for the middle term. And if some day, as a result of our analyses, we conclude that these mergers would be profitable for everyone, we will make them. In any case, we strongly reject any delimitation of boundaries based on purely partisan or linguistic considerations.

[Question] Speaking of the tax office of the agglomeration that will be dissolved, Serge Moureaux speaks of a holdup. Is the central government going to take a billion of the patrimony for its purse?

[Answer] It is completely wrong to say that. This patrimony will continue to benefit the region; we will work out the necessary procedures. And I would like to add that this tax office had accumulated more than 400 million in debts, almost half of its patrimony, and suffered an annual deficit of 140 million. While the intentions of the tax office were doubtless good, the results were very bad.

[Question] The CVP, in the chamber, through Eric Van Rompuy, asked for a coupling of a vote on the 1987 Brussels budget (and thus the release of inheritance taxes) and a vote on the agglomeration law...

[Answer] No form of coupling nor of delay is provided for in the Saint-Sylvestre agreements. But it is clear that it is in the interest of everyone to very quickly prepare this draft bill. As for Van Rompuy, he should learn that in politics respect for a word that has been given is very important. He should follow the example of Minister Dehaene who participates in our executive work and to whom I pay hommage here. He respects a word that has been given. But I see that Van Rompuy's chief aim is to systematically attack Dehaene in order to strike at him on the Brussels field.

[Question] One point has not been determined: will there be sponsorship of Flemish candidates for elections to the agglomeration council by Flemish parliamentary groups, or will there be separate Flemish-French speaking lists?

[Answer] This point has not yet been settled and both points of view have their supporters among both the Flemish ministers and the French speaking ministers. But it is also true that some Flemish people fear that separate lists (unilingual) might establish a sort of linguistic referendum in Brussels.

[Question] The aim is nevertheless clear: to prevent deviation from the spirit of the 1971 law, as when the Brussels Rassemblement [political group of adherents to a movement] caused some Flemish persons, characterized by Flanders as false Flemish persons, to be elected...

[Answer] Yes. Because I believe that it is to our credit to respect the spirit of the letter of a law. And those who have not applied this law have done so to the detriment of Brussels and the French speaking people of Brussels. I believe that our agreement, on the contrary, will make it possible to improve the community climate of Brussels and, from then on, to hasten the development of a definitive status.

[Question] Does that mean that you would accept equality in the agglomeration electoral college?

[Answer] This was accepted in the 1971 law. But in our agreement, we have provided that the package of jurisdictions assigned to the French speaking aldermen will be greater than the package that will be reserved for the Dutch speaking aldermen.

[Question] This accordion-like stroke to the agglomeration is nevertheless odd: first it is trimmed down, and then there is talk of inflating it...

[Answer] The trimming that has been decided on is quite simple. It is a question of abolishing duplication in the agglomeration and the executive council in order to hasten a whole series of procedures in behalf of the population. But we are leaving to the agglomeration the technical jurisdictions that are in operation, such as the fire department, the 900 Service, and trash collection. We are giving ourselves 2 years to improve conditions. Then, on the proposal of the executive council and the advice of the agglomeration, other jurisdictions, such as the water department, highway administration, and automation, could be transferred to the agglomeration.

[Question] But the PRL has talked of simplifying institutions and of doing away with the agglomeration.

[Answer] Personally, I was ready to go further, but there was no political majority for this opinion. What is most important, I believe, is that this agreement does not create any difficulty for the future and does not mortgage in any way the definitive agreement on Brussels, in accordance with article 107, item 4, of the constitution.

[Question] Nothing has been mortgaged, but neither is there any action?

[Answer] Yes. We have caused an important step to be taken in the minds of people. If the inheritance taxes had continued to be blocked by Flanders, the climate would still be embittered. Now, we can reflect more calmly and placate people's minds; and there is hope for a solution and status for

Brussels at the end of this legislative session or at the beginning of the next legislative session.

[Question] In your opinion, must the granting of guarantees to the Flemish people of Brussels always be an equal footing with the future of the French speaking people of the periphery?

[Answer] This point is included in the charter of the periphery, to which my party, the PRL, has subscribed.

[Question] In conclusion, what will this agreement in practice change in the life of the people of Brussels?

[Answer] The inheritance taxes will more than compensate for the decrease in the subsidy capital of the communes. We have money for urban renewal, which will also serve as a stimulus to the economic activity of the capital. We are simplifying quite a few administrative procedures. We are endeavoring to rehabilitate the communes, which will make it possible to improve the quality of public services and to open the way to lower communal taxes. And we are creating better spirit among the communities in Brussels. This is good.

8255  
CSO: 3619/21

## PAPER OFFERS PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS

Hamburg DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German 7 Dec 86 p 7

[Article by Hans-Peter Riese: "Unsettled Foundations. German-Soviet Fall-Out: Soviet Leadership Views Bonn's Foreign Policy Negatively"]

[Text] Chancellor Kohl's disastrous interview with the American news magazine NEWSWEEK was bad enough, but what is almost worse is the way the CDU is trying to shrug off the German-Soviet crisis, resulting from this interview, as only a momentary manipulation of public opinion. It is treated as if a "sore" Kremlin is out to use a "slip of the tongue" by the chancellor to influence the German election campaign. Those of us who want to understand the political and psychological implications of this occurrence will do well to recall afresh the German-Soviet treaty of August 1970 and what that treaty really has meant for German-Soviet relations and for Germany's relations with the rest of the East bloc.

This treaty fully enabled the Federal Republic to conduct--for the first time since the war--an active foreign policy with East and West alike. Peter Bender, a leading Ostpolitik expert, writes about this complicated process: "The Moscow Treaty opened for the Federal Republic the gate to the East bloc." What mattered to the Soviet Union was that "although the memories of the dead would remain and feelings of doubt and distrust would fade only slowly, West Germany no longer appeared as an enemy, but as a partner."

One of the mistaken convictions to which western politicians--and especially conservatives--subscribe is that the Kremlin dictates policy strictly in the interest of the communist state without taking into account the emergence of popular objective or the moods of the people. Yet if one today asks Soviets who took part in these negotiations, it becomes clear how difficult it was for Brezhnev--even at the pinnacle of his power--to push this treaty through. Resistance was considerable in Belorussia where fascist terror had been worse than anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Almost every family there still comes face to face with the past through the memory of their dead. Many cities--some quite large--still have not reached their pre-war population. The bestial terror committed against partisans and their no less cruel retaliations have scarred the Soviet national conscience deeply. The effect of these scars will be felt by many generations to come and will be independent of what kind of policy the Soviets practice towards the FRG and

the GDR. A Soviet politican dealing with German policy issues recently remarked: "The Russians are actually a people that forgives and forgets easily, but gets furious when salt is rubbed into still open wounds."

It was not only Helmut Kohl who did just that. The CDU started picking at German-Soviet relations quite some time ago so as to bring about a change of mood concerning this subject. While the foreign minister used every available international forum to invoke Germany's professed "continuity" in its Ostpolitik and even called for the necessity to initiate a "new phase", CDU politicians, such as Dregger and Zimmerman, not to mention second-rate bar room politicians, were celebrating the renaissance of a way of thinking long believed dead. It is this kind of thinking that led the CDU in the seventies to stubbornly fight Willy Brandt's treaty policies all the way to the Constitutional Court. As if there had never been an agreement in the Moscow Treaty--or in any of the other East bloc treaties, all modelled after the Moscow Treaty--as to the "inviolability of Europe's borders," such politicians are once again talking big about "the provisional nature" of these borders, and as if the Federal government had not once and for all acknowledged the "status quo" in Europe, such politicians, forever locked in the past, have reopened the "German question."

Moscow was very irritated when it heard of the storm of indignation that ensued when one of the CDU's own politicians, Volker Ruehe, mentioned in the Bundestag the political "commitments" inherent in the East bloc treaties. This occurrence has added weight to the opinion of those who, despite the treaties, have never stopped distrusting Bonn. The official argument given by diplomats, that all this is merely a reflection of the country's political pluralism and that it is up to the chancellor who stands firmly behind his foreign minister to determine the country's policy, has lost more and more credibility as Helmut Kohl reveals more and more of his understanding of history. The way the chancellor deals with Germany's most recent past, be it during his trip to Israel or in Bitburg, has always been interpreted by the Kremlin as an attempt to revise the way of thinking that has formed the prerequisite for treaties with socialist countries.

It is irrelevant at present how shrewdly Bonn argues about the necessities required by an election campaign, because the Soviet Union has already started to question the credibilty and sincerity of West Germany's foreign policy. The chancellor's appearances before West Germany's refugee associations became a political symbol in Moscow, even though Bonn took great care to explain how little political clout these associations have. This atmosphere, for once created by Bonn and not by Moscow, also accomodates West Germany's policy on disarmament very nicely. From the very beginning, the chancellor has given absolute priority to German relations with the U.S., and more specifically with the Reagan administration. For Moscow this has meant that the FRG is no longer a considerable factor in its East-West policies. In the course of General Secretary Gorbachev's reassessment of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviets have acknowledged that former Foreign Minsiter Gromyko committed a tactical mistake with his reaction to NATO's decision to update its intermediate nuclear forces in Western Europe. Helmut Schmidt still gets blamed for having initiated a new stage in the arms race with his support of

this decision, but Soviet delegates today are willing to hint that maybe the possibilities contained in the second part of the NATO decision had not been assessed realistically enough.

From Moscow's point of view, it is the Kohl government that has changed the NATO decision for good when it gave its support only to the part dealing with the arms build-up proper and paid no attention to the fact that it also provided for an offer to negotiate. Soviet foreign policy has always been realistic enough not to call on the Federal Republic to play the mediator between the superpowers. But the Soviets have always counted on the self-interest in security matters of this most important European ally of the U.S., especially when this self-interest was supported by a majority of the population. There have doubtless been times when the Soviets have nourished the illusion that they could, after all, prevent NATO's arms build-up decision by extending massive support to Western Europe's peace initiatives.

Today, the Soviet Union's assessment is different. It believes that it is the Federal government's policy that stands in the way of substantial disarmament. As the Soviets witness a ritualistic West German approval whenever the U.S. backs off from earlier positions, they see a German policy flexing its muscle. and in that they see a contradiction to the spirit behind the Ostpolitik and its treaties. The Soviets furthermore view the verbal expressions this power policy takes--as for example in the insensitive and amateurish attempt to deal with the consequences of the chancellor's interview--as a completely inappropriate behavior toward a superpower such as the Soviet Union.

Bonn meets the entire problem with the kind of petty shopkeeper mentality, the CDU has always reverted to--even before the Moscow treaties--whenever it needed to cover for its failures in the area of Ostpolitik. The government's argument, however, that Moscow will in the end need the economic strength of the FRG, has long since lost its effectiveness, because there is more involved in the lingering regression of German-Soviet trade than the Soviet Union's troubled finances.

Gorbachev calculates closer and negotiates tougher these days. Large orders that earlier used to always go to the Federal Republic because of its market position within the Soviet Union, wind up more and more often with Italian or French competitors, not least because their governments in Rome and Paris provide political flank protection. The most recent crisis in German-Soviet relations has spread alarm among German firms doing business with the East. The old rule that economic relations develop relatively independently from political relations basically still holds, but they too will become affected as serious ill-feelings between Bonn and the Soviet Union become a distinct possibility.

German-Soviet relations probably will not remain on ice for long, but that is not the main problem. It is much more critical that the Kohl government, through its policies, has managed to unsettle the foundations on which Germany's treaty policy rests. Nearly the entire repository of trust, built

up during the past 16 years, has been used up. At best, there might now follow a routine continuation of bilateral contacts conducted along the lines of the lowest common denominator.

There remains no question that the "new leaf" in bilateral relations that General Secretary Gorbachev wanted to turn over in July with Foreign Minister Genscher has remained unturned.

The self-inflicted lack of credibility in Germany's conduct of foreign affairs has set back the Federal Republic, once the most important power in Western Europe, and has decisively decreased its influence on Moscow. The Kremlin knows of course that without Bonn there won't ever be an independent European component in foreign policy and disarmament. However, because of the loss of the Federal Republic, Moscow has reassumed its old tendency of striking deals with the other superpowers without paying any attention to the Europeans.

13196/13104  
CSO: 3620/100

## CHANGE IN RIGHT-LEFT BALANCE AFTER RECENT ELECTIONS STUDIED

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Oct 86  
pp 597-604

[Article by Pierre Martin: "The Balance of Right-Left Forces in 1986"]

[Text] In comparison with the preceding elections of national importance (legislative and presidential), the legislative and regional elections of March 1986 showed evolutions which can, without excess, be qualified as major changes in the right-left balance and within the two camps (table 1).

Table 1. Results of the legislative elections of March 1986  
(according to the newspaper LE MONDE, for metropolitan France)

	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Registered</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Cast</u>
Votes cast	75.1	(100)
Extreme left	1.1	(1.5)
PC	7.3	(9.7)
PS	23.7	(31.6)
MRG	.2	(.3)
Miscellaneous left	.7	(.9)
Ecologists	.9	(1.2)
Miscellaneous	.1	(.2)
RPR and UDF	31.6	(42)
Miscellaneous right	2	(2.7)
FN and dissidents	7.4	(9.9)
Total left	33	(45.4)
Total right	41	(54.6)

With the establishment of a balance of right-left forces at 55-45, the emergence of an extreme right force at 10 percent, the continued

decline of the PC [Communist Party], the relative decline of the UDF-RPR [French Democratic Union-Rally for the Republic] group and a PS [Socialist Party] with more than 30 percent of the votes cast, these elections essentially confirm the shifts noted in the municipal elections of 1983, the 1984 European elections and the 1985 district elections. The clear comeback of the party in power, the PS, was not enough to enable it to keep the government.

#### The New Balance of Right-Left Forces


##### Relatively Substantial Abstentions

At 21.7 percent, the abstention rate in the legislative elections of March 1986 was 5 points higher than that of the first round of March 1978 (16.7 percent). This relatively large abstention confirms the tendency toward abstention since the 1974 presidential election (table 2). This increase is constant, not counting the exceptional case of the 1981 legislative elections which are diminished by the presidential elections which preceded them. It is certain that the increase in abstentions in 1986 in comparison with the 1978 legislative elections or the 1981 presidential elections is underestimated because we are comparing one-round elections (1986) with two-round elections (1978-1981) and it is likely that the traditional second-round voters voted on 16 March. We also see an unusually large number of blank and invalid votes (3.2 percent of those registered) which on one hand indicates a rejection of the political system, but which is also due to mistakes arising from a lack of understanding of the new election rules (it is difficult to determine the proportions of these two factors).

Table 2. Abstention (Percentage)

	<u>Year</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
First round presidential elections	1974	15.1
First round legislative elections	1978	16.7
First round presidential elections	1981	18.3
First round legislative elections	1981	29.1
Legislative elections	1986	21.7

Map 1. Evolution in abstentions between the 1978 and the 1986 legislative elections



Key:

1. Increase in percentage of registered voters  
Average: + 5 (16.7 to 21.7)
2. Less than 2
3. From 2 to 4
4. From 4 to 6
5. From 6 to 8
6. More than 8

If we look at the increase in abstentions since 1978, we see that it has an impact on the balance of right-left forces. Overall, the increase in abstentions (map 1) is concentrated in northern France, following a crescent from Bordeaux to Bourg-en-Bresse. This map is very similar to that of increased unemployment which is structured on the proportion of youth in the population. When we make a more detailed study within the region or department, this increase in abstentions appears clearly in the working class areas of the left and especially in former PC strongholds.

Table 3, which deals with the departments of the Paris region, clearly shows the close correlation between increased abstentions and the decline of the left (in percentage of voters registered). However, this connection between increased abstentions and the decline of the left, especially evident in the Paris region and northern France, is not noted everywhere. In particular, in southern France where abstentions have increased slowly, then the left has sometimes declined markedly. There are certainly sizable swings from the left to the right in these regions.

Table 3. Relationship between increased abstentions and the left's decline in the Paris region between the 1981 presidential elections and the 1986 legislative elections

	<u>Decline in turnout (cast/registered)</u>	<u>Decline of the left</u>
Paris	-3	-2.4
Hauts-de-Seine	-3.9	-5.5
Yvelines	-4.9	-5.7
Val-de-Marne	-5.8	-6.7
Essonne	-5.8	-6.9
Seine-et-Marne	-6.8	-7.2
Val-d'Oise	-7.5	-8.1
Seine-Saint-Denis	-8.2	-9.8

#### Changes in the Right

Throughout France, the right improved its showing in terms of voters registered and votes cast in the 1974 and 1981 presidential elections and the 1978 and 1981 legislative elections. This increase has been very uneven (map 2). In comparison with the 1978 legislative elections, the right's improved showing in the percentage of voters registered is especially evident in the Mediterranean south and in the Paris region.

We also see the influence of certain personalities who head voting lists: Baudis in Haute-Garonne, Barnier in Savoie, Barrot in Haute-Loire, Chaban-Delmas in Gironde, Royer in Indre-et-Loire, Guena in Dordogne and Giscard d'Estaing in le Puy-de-Dome. The right's increase can also be explained by other reasons: the effect of the proportional rule in Pas-de-Calais and the political retirement of Chandernagor (PS) in Creuse.

Yet, on the whole, we can link map 2 and map 3, showing the results of the FN [National Front]. Indeed, it is particularly clear in the Mediterranean south and the Paris region that the right's improved showing is due only to the FN's results. In Alsace and Lorraine in

the east, the FN's good showing was paid for by the sharp drop (among registered voters) of the UDF-RPR right. Throughout western France (Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie, Pays de Loire, Bretagne, Poitou/Charentes--less Charente-Maritime), the right's decline, continuous since 1974, was confirmed. We see both the confirmation of geographic changes occurring since 1974 (notably with the right's decline in western France going hand in hand with dechristianization) (footnote 1) (Philippe Braud: "Legislative Elections of March 1978 in Brittany," Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 28 (6) December 1978) and the upsets of the 1984 European elections, marked by the FN's appearance and the strong showing of the right in the Mediterranean south because of the FN.

The left's recovery in the 1984 European elections did not even partially reverse the major changes of voting geography that we noted during this election. Quite the contrary, the strength of the extreme right grew in the Mediterranean south, there counter-balancing the left's recovery. In comparison with France as a whole, these departments still lean a little more to the right.

The UDF-RPR right does not seem to have benefited, except for the predictable recovery from much of its losses due to circumstances in the 1981 legislative elections, from the left's decline. The southwest is the exception where crossovers from the socialist and communist left are certain, but here there has always been some voter instability and a strong attraction of local leaders in a very center-left voting population. A protest-oriented temperament combined with a certain political moderation facilitates, in times of economic and social difficulties, crossovers between the right UDF-RPR and the PS, to the detriment of the incumbent. The PS benefited from this in 1974 and 1981 and has since suffered for it.

A correlation exists between the still relatively substantial turnout for some MRG [Radical Left Movement], former MRG or miscellaneous left voting lists in certain departments (Lot, Hautes Pyrenees, Ariège) and the disappointing showing of the UDF-RPR which was not able to take full advantage of the protest vote of a very moderate electorate.

#### The Decline of the Left

Let us now see how the left is declining.

Table 4 covers the departments of the Paris region. It is a comparison (in percentage of registered voters) between the first round of the 1981 presidential elections and the 1986 regional elections. I preferred the regional rather than the legislative elections because the regional elections measured the ecologists and hence, with the difference, measured the left more accurately since part of the

ecology voters voted socialist in the legislative elections to make their vote count. In addition to the very clear connection between the left's decline and the drop in votes cast, we observe that the left's decline is structured on the PC's decline. However, the non-communist left is also losing votes and we see that the geography of losses of the non-communist left in the first round of the 1981 presidential elections is itself based on the PC's influence (Seine-Saint Denis and Val-de-Marne -3.3 percent; Val-d'Oise and Essonne -2.4 percent; Seine-et-Marne -2.1 percent; Hauts-de-Seine -.6 percent; Yvelines - no change; Paris +.4 percent). Thus, not only did the Socialist Party not pick up communist votes in the PC fiefs, but there it had a poorer showing than on 26 April 1981.

Table 4. The Left's Losses in the Paris Region  
(1981 Presidential Elections - 1986 Regional Elections)

	<u>Evolution</u> <u>Cast/</u> <u>Registered</u>	<u>Evolution</u> <u>of the</u> <u>Left</u>	<u>Evolution</u> <u>of the PC,</u> <u>Extreme</u> <u>Left</u>	<u>Evolution</u> <u>of the</u> <u>Non-</u> <u>communist</u> <u>Left</u>
Paris	-3.9	-3.9	-4.3	.4
Hauts-de-Seine	-4.3	-6.2	-5.6	-.6
Yvelines	-5.1	-6.1	-6.1	=
Val-de-Marne	-6.3	-8.8	-5.5	-3.3
Essonne	-6.3	-8.3	-5.9	-2.4
Seine-et-Marne	-7.3	-8.3	-6.2	-2.1
Val-d'Oise	-7.8	-9.6	-7.2	-2.4
Seine-Saint-Denis	-8.4	-11.1	-7.8	-3.3

The results of the 1986 legislative elections in the town of Saint-Denis (table 5) are a good illustration of this situation. The PS overtook the PC in this commune for the first time since 1920. However, it is more accurate to say that the PC slipped behind because the PS did not pick up any of the PC's votes since 1981 and itself declined slightly (in percentage of registered voters). Most communist votes lost were abstentions.

Table 5. Commune of Saint-Denis

	<u>First Round - 1981</u> <u>Presidential Elections</u>		<u>1986 Legislative</u> <u>Elections</u>	
	<u>% Registered</u>	<u>% Cast</u>	<u>% Registered</u>	<u>% Cast</u>
Cast	77.2	(100)	67	(100)
Extreme Left	2	(2.5)	2.1	(3.1)

Table 5. Commune of Saint-Denis (continued)


	<u>First Round - 1981</u> <u>Presidential Elections</u>		<u>1986 Legislative</u> <u>Elections</u>	
	<u>% Registered</u>	<u>% Cast</u>	<u>% Registered</u>	<u>% Cast</u>
PC	28.2	(36.6)	16.9	(25.2)
PS-MRG	19	(24.5)	18.9	(28.2)
Miscellaneous left	1	(1.5)	.7	(1.1)
Ecologists	2.9	(3.8)	1.6	(2.3)
UDF	13.2	(17.1)	5.1	(7.6)
RPR	9.2	(11.9)	11.2	(16.7)
Miscellaneous right	1.6	(2.1)		
FN			10.5	(15.7)
Total left	50.3	(65.1)	38.6	(57.6)
Total right	24	(31.1)	26.8	(40.1)

Looking at the Paris results, we can pinpoint the evolutions in the leftist electorate. Table 6, which makes the connection between the poor voter turnout and the left's decline, shows us that the left's losses in Paris were especially concentrated in the working class districts of the northeast (the 10th, 11th, 17th, 19th and 20th) and the 13th. In these districts, voter turnout dropped considerably and the left was its only victim. In the districts of the center, on the other hand, the turnout remained relatively stable and the left held its own well, the PS picking up almost all the PC's losses. Moreover, results in these districts produced the socialist success in Paris. From an analysis of the results of Paris and the Paris region, we can conclude the following: in the segment of the population not directly affected by the economic crisis, the left is holding its own very well, voter turnout remains stable and all the FN votes come from the right. In the working class segments affected by the crisis, the left declined markedly, some of its traditional voters abstained but a fraction voted for the FN. Moreover, with this group of people, the FN has made the most progress since the 1984 European elections, thus compensating for its losses to the UDF-RPR in the more affluent segments (high ranking government workers, merchants). (footnote 2) (According to the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] exit poll, 31 percent of the FN voters in the 1984 European elections voted for the UDF or the RPR in March 1986)

Table 6. 1981 Presidential Elections 1986 Regional Elections

<u>Districts</u>	<u>Evolution-Votes Cast</u>	<u>Evolution of the Left</u>
First	-.5	-.4
Second	-.3	-1.2
Third	-3.8	-2.7
Fourth	-3.1	-2.5
Fifth	-2	-.9
Sixth	-.2	+.2
Seventh	-1	-1.5
Eighth	-4.1	-2.7
Ninth	-2.9	-1.9
Tenth	-4.3	-5
Eleventh	-6.4	-5
Twelfth	-4.4	-4.5
Thirteenth	-4.1	-5.7
Fourteenth	-1.3	-2.2
Fifteenth	-3.8	-4.3
Sixteenth	-2.2	-2.2
Seventeenth	-5.2	-4
Eighteenth	-4.7	-5.1
Nineteenth	-7.8	-7.7
Twentieth	-7.2	-6.9
Total	-3.9	-3.9


Map 2. The Right's Evolution Between 1978 and 1986 Legislative Elections



Key:

1. Increase in percentage of registered voters  
Average: +3.3
2. Less than .5
3. Between .5 and 2.5
4. Between 2.5 and 4.5
5. Between 4.5 and 6.5
6. More than 6.5

Map 3. The National Front in the 1986 Legislative Elections  
(with dissidents)



Key:

1. Increase in percentage of registered voters  
Average +7.4
2. Less than 4
3. From 4 to 6
4. From 6 to 8
5. From 8 to 10
6. More than 10

## Conclusions and Outlook for Change

The left is declining in different ways in different regions. In northern France, the votes were lost primarily because of abstentions and a fraction went to Le Pen. In southern France, crossovers to the right were larger than the losses through abstentions. In the southwest, leftist voters switched to the UDF and the RPR. In the southeast, the FN was the principal beneficiary of the left's decline. In general, the left's decline was particularly noticeable in the working class segments affected by the crisis; this decline hit the PC especially but the PS was not spared. Among these groups, the PS did not benefit from the communist losses. On the other hand, in the more affluent segments, spared from the economic crisis, the left is holding up very well and the PS is picking up the communist losses. The left's clear defeat must, however, be nuanced by two facts--there was an obvious comeback by the PS since 1984 as the latter did not appear to be defeated really after March 1986, and the right only achieved its victory due to the emergence of a massive extreme right electorate.

The political evolutions since March 1986 because of the elections and notably the formation of the Chirac government and cohabitation will create more changes in the right-left balance. Two theories can be put forward.

The first, favorable to the Chirac government, would be a stabilization of the balance of right-left forces with a gradual increase, favored by the return of the majority ballot and a law-and-order policy, of FN voters switching to the RPR. In this event, the current situation would lead to a phase of neo-Gaullist domination over French political life as in the years 1960-1970, under de Gaulle and Pompidou. This is not the most likely evolution. The more likely theory, in our opinion, is that the balance of right-left forces will continue to change but in favor of the left--especially the PS--now that it has returned to the opposition. Yet this situation of being the opposition could also help the FN. If the left makes a comeback--and it is difficult to predict its scope--it should happen in the context of continued geographic changes of the right-left balance, contrasting more and more the west's movement to the left and the southeast's movement to the right.

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CSO: 3519/61

## GISCARD ON PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM, COHABITATION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Jan 87 p 14

[Text] "I do not believe that cohabitation is at the origin of the difficulties we have experienced in recent weeks."

In one statement broadcast over the RTL last evening, Valery Giscard d'Estaing confirmed that the student demonstrations and the SNCF strikes were no challenge to his support of the principle of cohabitation. He even believes that it "did not complicate" the development of these crises.

He emphasized that the opinion polls confirm the support of the concept of cohabitation by French citizens, but the former president believes that "combative cohabitation is not the cohabitation desired by the people of France." He urges, on the contrary, what he calls "cooperative cohabitation." In passing, he urged the Elysee and Matignon Palaces to agree to cooperate so the institutions, in their current operations, "will not ambush each other."

When asked if the difficulties in the practice of cohabitation at present do not prove that Raymond Barre is right, the former chief of state answered: "The idea of those who criticize cohabitation is that France is either not sufficiently divided into two parts, or else that it is too much divided." This is a statement which would seem to put an end to the rumors which have circulated recently about a possible rapprochement between Giscard and Barre. Moreover, the deputy from Puy-de-Dome reiterated that he will not adopt a position on the presidential elections before the fall of 1987, which clearly indicates that all of the present speculations are premature.

An advocate of rehabilitating the parliament, Giscard d'Estaing urges the government to show "great moderation" in the use of Article 49-3, which allows the government to force the hand of its majority in some cases.

Still firmly urging a reduction in the presidential term of office, the former president of the republic hopes to see a referendum on the subject in 1987. He even added: "It will come, for in the logic of things, this is a necessary modernization." And when it is pointed out to him that such a referendum, as proposed by Francois Mitterrand, would if successful be likely to consolidate his position with regard to the presidential elections, Giscard d'Estaing retorts that it is not a question of who benefits from this referendum, since

it is important that it be held "for the benefit of France." In his view, this would have the advantage of demonstrating national cohesion concerning our institutions, so often challenged in the past by the left wing.

#### A Social Conscience

While he hopes for a referendum this year, he does not, on the other hand, foresee elections, because he does not believe in "disturbance of the calendar." Rejecting personal questions ("I came to discuss France, not myself"), the former chief of state reasserted the role of the UDF in the center as the "keel of the French vessel in times of trouble."

A substantial portion of this broadcast, which lasted more than an hour, was indeed devoted to the problems of the SNCF. In the view of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, there is a aspect common to the conflicts of the students and those of the railroad workers. "These conflicts occurred in sectors which have suffered trauma and which have revealed psychological fragility." The trauma in the one case has been the very high unemployment rate among young people, and in the other, the great upsets which have occurred in the SNCF.

The former president does not believe this should be interpreted as a rejection of liberalism (there is no indication that a return to socialism is desired), but rather as difficulty in adapting to a new style of life. This difficulty should be approached through communication, in particular. This was an excellent opportunity for reiteration of what he said long ago: "Liberalism must have a social conscience." Otherwise, its fate is rejection.

The former president of the republic believes that his role is to hope that the government action will succeed, rather than criticizing it. In his view, "The general direction is good," although there may be errors of method and timing within it. "It is not necessary to change the direction--that is good, but it is necessary to pay attention to weak points." The general trend toward reducing inflation, reducing deficits and liberating the economy, which has the support of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, should not however be allowed to obscure the problems which remain, in particular the planned growth of 2 percent, which, while it puts an end to the destruction of jobs, is creating none, and the foreign trade deficit. In the opinion of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, there has been "a near disaster in our industrial trade," because "We are not competitive in terms of prices and production itself."

On the subject of the SNCF conflict, Valery Giscard d'Estaing urges "separating" the problems and moving toward "a clear process which the public can assess." This requires an effort on all sides and an indispensable increase in minimum service. In this connection, the former president disapproves of the fact that Francois Mitterrand met with a delegation of strikers, using a method incompatible with his role as an arbiter.

In his view, "The way in which this conflict will be settled will be a test of the capacity of France to be a modern country."

## CITIZENS' INTERPRETATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER, COHABITATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Jan 87 p 8

[Article by J.-M.C.: "Cohabitation--A Sharing of Power Which Does the Prime Minister Little Good"]

[Text] The survey LE MONDE and the RTL asked the SOFRES to make on the sharing of power between the chief of state and the prime minister and on the future of cohabitation makes it possible, at a time when the prime minister's team and Mr Chirac himself are no longer reluctant to speak of the possibility of a "clash," to obtain a more accurate measurement of the weight of an opinion firmly in favor of this institutional experiment. And at a time when Raymond Barre, notoriously hostile to such an experiment, has also abandoned his relative silence, four main lessons can be drawn from this survey.

1. The popularity of cohabitation is the stronger since the sharing of power reflects the desires of French citizens. This sharing, as it is perceived, makes a clear distinction between the two areas of the president's action (foreign policy, national defense) and all the rest (economic policy, education, appointments), wherein, on the contrary, the full powers of the prime minister are exercised.

This distribution corresponds to the division French citizens expected when they were questioned by the SOFRES in February 1986, before the cohabitation policy was implemented. Without a doubt, one of factors which explains its success with the public is to be found here. This almost total coincidence also characterizes the failure of the prime minister, who up until last September had attempted to compete with the president for his areas of action. However, this failure had hardly any effect, because, in short, the latter yielded to the desires of the public, all factions taken together (on this point, there is no difference between the supporters of the left and those of the right).

2. The sharing of power is regarded as satisfactory. The individuals questioned who claim affiliation with the right wing are naturally those most satisfied to see the government in control of the domestic sphere. It is equally natural to find leftist sympathizers believing that Mr Chirac has too much power. But overall, the public has voiced relative satisfaction with the current sharing of power, although it is not deceived. The people do not

Table No 1

In your opinion, is it Mitterrand or Chirac who,  
since the legislative elections:

	Comparisons with French Citizen's Desires (LE MONDE-RTL-SOFRES)	
	Feb 1986*	Dec 1986
	100%	100%
Has determined economic policy		
Mitterrand	32	13
Chirac	51	70
No opinion	17	17
Has determined foreign policy		
Mitterrand	56	66
Chirac	28	14
No opinion	16	20
Has determined educational policy		
Mitterrand	27	14
Chirac	53	64
No opinion	20	22
Has pursued negotiations with foreign chiefs of state and governments		
Mitterrand	66	64
Chirac	20	14
No opinion	14	22
Has made national defense decisions		
Mitterrand	61	62
Chirac	24	20
No opinion	15	18
Has appointed the main administrative officials (prefects, ambassadors, ministry directors)		
Mitterrand	39	20
Chirac	43	55
No opinion	18	25
Has represented France in the eyes of foreign countries		
Mitterrand	--	73
Chirac	--	11
No opinion	--	16

\*In February 1986, the exact wording of the question was: "Concretely, who by right should make decisions in the following sectors, Mr Mitterrand or the prime minister?"

believe in complicity on this matter between Mitterrand and Chirac. Even the communist voters appear uninfluenced by their party's campaign designed precisely to give the idea of complicity credibility. French citizens have a realistic view of cohabitation--the sharing of power does indeed reflect a balance of forces.

3. Mr Chirac has not emerged the winner from this experiment. Here we come perhaps to a situational limit to the survey, made just after the retreat of the prime minister on the university issue and the beginning of the social crisis. This result is nonetheless worrisome for a prime minister who has based his presidential strategy on cohabitation, but who is not seen as benefiting from it.

4. The new institutional balance will prevail in the future. While a debate is now beginning about the balance of power just following an experiment marked by a net reduction in the president's authority, it is interesting to note that the majority of the citizens hope that the rebalancing which has been occurring for 9 months will last. This has been the result of actions more or less equally shared by the right and the left. Obviously the public is developing a liking for the no longer monarchic, but now arbitral, nature of the president's functions.

However, this statement must be balanced by another. In their view of the constitutional future, French citizens are in fact influence by those currently holding executive posts. Those who claim affiliation with the left wing would, after all, rather see more power for Mr Mitterrand, while those affiliated with the right wing want more for Mr Chirac.

In the final analysis, this taste for the adjustment of the balance of power resulting from cohabitation is not accompanied by a desire to see cohabitation itself endure. The majority of the French citizens have a classic view of political balances. For the future, they would favor the traditional concordance between a presidential majority and a parliamentary majority.

No scheme involving a refusal to dissolve the Assembly following the presidential balloting would be understood, nor would the "blank check" demanded by Mr Rocard on "The Moment of Truth" either. In fact, Mr Chirac is the only possible presidential candidate who might make a commitment not to dissolve it, because he would have no need to do so to ensure coherence in the presidential and parliamentary majorities.

This lesson clearly reveals the limits of the tendency of French citizens to approve of cohabitation.

Table No 2

Based on the balance of political forces, do you believe that  
this sharing of power gives:

	All French Citizens	Leftist Sympathizers	Rightist Sympathizers
Too much power to Mitterrand	9	3	19
Too much power to Chirac	27	49	7
Or is satisfactory	45	38	56
No opinion	19	10	18
	100%	100%	100%

Table No 3

Do you think that Mitterrand and Chirac are in agreement  
on this sharing of power?

	All French Citizens	Leftist Sympathizers	Rightist Sympathizers
Entirely in agreement	6	6	7
Somewhat in agreement	32	31	36
In some disagreement	34	37	35
Not at all in agreement	17	19	15
No opinion	11	7	7
	100%	100%	100%

Table No 4

In your opinion, who will emerge the winner from the period of cohabitation?

	All French Citizens	Leftist Sympathizers	Rightist Sympathizers
Mitterrand	34	52	21
Chirac	15	9	25
Neither	34	27	40
No opinion	17	12	14

Table No 5

After the 1988 presidential elections, would you like the institutional practice to give more power than today, less power or the same amount:

	More	Less	Same	No Opinion
To the president of the republic	22	24	53	11
To the prime minister	12	24	52	12
To the parliament	24	7	52	17

Table No 6

If Francois Mitterrand is reelected president of the republic in 1988, do you hope he will hold new legislative elections or keep today's Assembly?

What if it is Michel Rocard?  
 What if it is Raymond Barre?  
 What if it is Jacques Chirac?

	All French Citizens	Leftist Sympathizers	Rightist Sympathizers
	100%	100%	100%
<b>Francois Mitterrand</b>			
New elections	66	84	54
Same Assembly	20	9	34
No opinion	14	7	12
<b>Michel Rocard</b>			
New elections	60	79	48
Same Assembly	17	9	29
No opinion	23	12	23
<b>Raymond Barre</b>			
New elections	50	60	45
Same Assembly	29	23	39
No opinion	21	17	16
<b>Jacques Chirac</b>			
New elections	43	53	40
Same Assembly	37	32	46
No opinion	20	15	14

This poll was taken between 19 and 23 December, with a sampling of 1,000 individuals representative of the whole of the French population 18 years of age or older.

5157

CSO:3519/54

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF DELEGATION GREMETZ, LEPLAT VISIT ETHIOPIA

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 26 Dec 86 p 20

[Text] At the invitation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party (PTE), a delegation representing the French Communist Party (PCF) including Maxine Gremetz, secretary of the Central Committee and the official in charge of the foreign policy section, and Andre Leplat, a Central Committee associate, visited Ethiopia from 22 to 24 December 1986.

The delegation was welcomed by the secretary general of the PTE, President Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The delegation met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Berhanu Bayeh, Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ashagre Yigletu and a Central Committee delegation.

The talks provided an opportunity for a broad exchange of views on the economic, social and political development of the two countries, the international situation and more particularly, the problems on the African continent, which is faced today with an extremely serious economic and social crisis, massive poverty and hunger. Debt is pushing a number of countries toward financial strangulation. The deterioration of the terms of trade, which is contributing greatly to this very worrisome development in the situation, is a burden on all the peoples, increasing all of the economic and social difficulties and putting the capacity and prospects for development of the African countries in jeopardy.

The Ethiopian Workers' Party and the French Communist Party emphasized the interest of the Ethiopian and French peoples in the joint struggle for independence and development and for a new international economic order. They stressed the need to put new types of cooperation and convergent actions into operation in order to contribute, beginning now and from this point of view, to economic and social progress and the satisfaction of needs.

The PCF delegation was able to see the first results achieved by the new Ethiopia, 12 years after the fall of the feudal regime, in establishing the foundations for independent development, combating hunger and illiteracy, improving the conditions of life for the people and democratizing the institutions. Numerous obstacles inherited after centuries of servitude remain to be overcome in order to bring the country out of underdevelopment. The task is immense and it offers, among other things, a broad field for

Franco-Ethiopian cooperation, which must be based on mutual respect and interests so that it can contribute effectively to the development of the two peoples.

In France, the distress of a people at grips with the drama of starvation is being used in vulgar and deceitful campaigns in the hope of discrediting a country which has embarked upon a progressive task and altering its guidelines. The representatives of the PCF informed their interlocutors of the scope of the solidarity movement developing in France against these slanders and promoting the offering of concrete aid to the victims of the drought.

The meeting offered an opportunity for stressing the essential role which the PTE and the PCF assigned to the struggle to achieve peace and halt the armaments race and against the militarization of space. The two parties share the ideal of a world without weapons and without war. As was stated by the movement of nonaligned nations at the summit meeting in Harare, there is an inseparable link between action for development and action for disarmament....

conflicts and the liquidation of the hateful system of apartheid would create more favorable conditions for the security and development of all people. In particular, they asserted their total and active solidarity with the people of South Africa and with the ANC in the struggle being waged against the regime in Pretoria and for their freedom, dignity and independence.

This visit, which was characterized by a warm atmosphere of friendship and fraternity, confirmed the close bonds which exist between the two parties and their joint will to strengthen cooperation. To this end, a cooperation plan for the year 1987 was drafted.

5157

CSO:3519/54

POLITICAL

FRANCE

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR FACES SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 15 Nov 86 p 4

[Interview with Louis Vianey, secretary of the General Confederation of Labor and member of the PCF Political Bureau, at the 11th World Trade-Union Conference in Berlin, by a representative of the editors of RABOTNICHESKO DELO: "French Working Class Faces Serious Trials"]

[Text] During the 11th World Trade-Union Conference in Berlin Louis Vianey, secretary of the General Confederation of Labor and member of the PCF Political Bureau, answered a number of questions for a representative of the editors.

[Question] Lately the French press has been talking very often about the difficulties facing our trade-union movement and has even mentioned symptoms of crisis in its development. What is your opinion on this question and what are the basic problems confronting the French trade unions?

[Answer] True, the subject of trade-union "crisis" figures very often in the political vocabulary of France. The main object of such hypotheses is to undermine confidence in the trade-union movement. However, it must be pointed out that unfortunately real facts exist that can indeed afford grounds for such assessments. What are these realities?

First, the membership of the trade unions as a whole, including the General Confederation of Labor, is declining. Second, in the struggle against capital favorable results are harder and harder to achieve. Employers and big capital are fighting fiercely for their interests and making skillful use of the crisis to strike blows against the workers' social gains. This hurts the workers' confidence in the trade unions and in the latter's ability to champion their interests and respond positively to the problems facing them. Therefore, the general conclusion can be drawn that there is a weakening of the trade-union movement.

To this we have to add that the crisis and the closing down of enterprises in sectors such as shipbuilding, steel production, motor vehicle manufacture, etc., in which tens of thousands of people have been dismissed in recent years, adversely affect the trade-union movement and especially its ability to act effectively. It must not be forgotten that the dismissals are combined with

political actions of the government to weaken the trade unions. Capital uses its specific tools to achieve its aims. It exerts tremendous ideological pressure through the most influential mass information media and every day conducts a single-minded campaign of discouraging the workers and persuading them of the inevitability of the crisis, the necessity for sacrifices, etc. To all this must also be added the compromises with, and the concessions to capital that the reformist trade unions have recently been making. This, too, contributes to a general decline of confidence in the trade-union movement. In this sense I would say that there is a crisis in the reformist trade-union movement, which impacts on the class trade-union movement. At the same time we do not believe that there is a crisis in the class trade unions, for the General Confederation of Labor has stood firm by its goals and is making all-round efforts to defend the fundamental interests of our working class. But in carrying out this policy it has indisputably encountered new difficulties and provocations characteristic of the contemporary historical period.

[Question] What are the main tasks facing the class trade-union movement in France today?

[Answer] Our main task is not to let up the pressure on capital and to extend our operations on all fronts with the most vigorous worker participation. We are striving to enlist the maximum number of organized and unorganized workers of the most diverse social status--manual laborers, office workers, technicians, etc.--into the class struggle. Despite the differences they all have common interests. We want to clarify the present-day situation for the workers directly and in the widest possible dialogue, and create conditions for their commitment to the struggles, bearing in mind their specific interests, job, and living conditions. Achieving unity in our actions means uniting as many workers as possible from a given enterprise, from a region, from the entire country, for specific actions. The General Confederation of Labor is doing everything possible along these lines.

We are endeavoring to widen our influence in order better to defend the workers' interests and halt the attacks on the social gains. In this sense, our main goal is the campaign for employment and for cutting down joblessness. We are defending the interests of the unemployed, but we are not overlooking the fact that the main thing in this struggle is getting those who do have jobs to commit themselves. For we must wage the struggle with them, and only with them can we achieve effective results.

We are waging a struggle to protect the workers' purchasing power and their real income. An especially important thrust in our struggle recently is opposition to the owners' efforts to impose so-called flexible working time. I am referring to a nonstandardized workday and pay, to the creation of conditions for the exploitation of people unprotected by legislation and isolated from the trade-union movement. In this way the bourgeoisie wants to smash the collective bargaining system and the possibility of defending the workers' interests.

It is of great significance in our activity to ensure worker participation in determining the direction of economic development--investments, labor

conditions, markets, etc. It is a matter of expanding the possibilities for bringing the workers' influence to bear on social development, for this, in final analysis, is the decisive question.

[Question] Along what lines, in your opinion, must trade-union activity be improved in order to update their ideological platform and practical activity?

[Answer] You well understand that tremendous efforts are required of us to reorganize, adapt and modernize our forms of activity to the requirements of present-day social realities.

In this sense the General Confederation of Labor is making efforts to update and adapt to the new conditions. Thus, for example, an especially important task is to adapt to the interests and social consciousness of the new groups of hired workers, and we know that the social cast of mind is changing. This holds true especially for the scientific and technical intellectuals and for office workers. The position they occupy is such that we cannot conceive of the trade-union movement without them. And this means finding the appropriate way, work style and language that will enable us to enlist them into the trade-union movement.

So it is especially important to emphasize what we in the General Confederation of Labor call "application of the democratic approach." We have in mind a specific trade-union approach by which we endeavor to persuade workers to take an attitude towards the problems that agitate them and participate in specific actions. We must find an appropriate approach to every social group, bearing in mind its special features and observing common class interests.

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CSO: 2200/34

## CITIZEN VIEWS ON RECENT STRIKES EXAMINED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 13 Jan 87 p 9

[Article by Charles Rebois: "Fifty-Five Percent of French People Think Strikes Excessive"]

[Text] The Figaro-Sofres poll that we are publishing today, after 28 days of the SNCF strike and when several clashes are being prolonged, confirms that French people have had enough. Public opinion sides decisively with users of public services who demonstrated yesterday. But the condemnation of the strikers is not blind: the right to strike must be kept in public services, on condition that it does not give rise to excess as was in fact the case.

Fifty-five percent think that the present social clashes constitute an abuse of the right to strike compared with 37 percent who consider them a normal exercise of that right. This judgment was directly influenced by the sector of activity of the individuals questioned and their political allegiance. Independent laborers were most severe, followed by salaried workers in the private sector. The majority of communist and socialist sympathizers--the former especially--closed ranks behind the strikers, which is hardly surprising.

More surprising is that 65 percent of inhabitants in towns of less than 2,000 people condemn the attitude of the strikers from whom they seem to have suffered less than those in the large cities. Paradoxically, Parisians who are hardest hit by the effects of the clashes show greater resignation than do provincials; 50 percent of them think that the present social actions represent a normal exercise of the right to strike.

A particularly revealing result is that 49 percent believe that these are political strikes, compared with 40 percent who believe that only the defense of vocational interests is at stake. Originally, this distinction was not evident. The establishment of "coordination" outside the unions seemed to indicate a rejection of political involvement, even though in many cases leftist elements had infiltrated them. But as the days have gone by, it has become evident to public opinion that the radicalization of the CGT's attitude, and its desire to generalize the clashes to serve the goals of the Communist Party were the result of political aims.

Fifty percent agree with the government's decision to refuse to meet the demand for an increase in salaries in public services because that would compromise the economic recovery (36 percent hold the contrary opinion). One can observe there the demonstration of a collective realization of the national interest. This fact is comforting at a time when many observers have commented critically on the behavior of French society, contrasting it with the German people's willingness to make an effort.

### Electricity Cuts

Under these circumstances, what should the government's attitude be? It should stand firm, the majority of French people say. Only 36 percent say it should make more concessions, but only 20 percent believe that the thing to do is to wait for the strikers to go back to work on their own. One may conclude that what was conceded by the authorities is considered enough and there is no need to make greater concessions.

But how then is the problem to be resolved if the conflict continues? The answer of 46 percent of those questioned was that the government should requisition the strikers to provide minimum service. The paradox is that the same number of people (48 percent) think that the right to strike should be maintained in public services as it is at present. No doubt one must understand that this position dictated by principle--the right to strike is an intangible right inscribed in the constitution--holds good so long as the vital interests of the country do not suffer as a result.

In this regard, the degree to which the conflicts cause harm represents a decisive factor. It did not escape anyone's notice that the electricity cuts marked a turning point in provoking the reaction of users. Fifty-nine percent of French people stated that it was these interruptions--often savage--that bothered them most. Someone here wrote that a day without electricity means insurrection. And Lenin was able to say: "Socialism means the soviets plus electricity."

The fact that the CGT--with the Communist Party in the background--holds 52 percent of union representation in the EDF makes the measure a dangerous one.

The railway men do not hold such power. Their strike affected only 18 percent of French people, and the roadways made up for the lack of rail transport. The lesson threatens to have consequences of which the SNCF could be the first victim. The urban transport strike only stands in fourth place, but if the poll had involved Parisians only, the results would probably have been different.

At this stage, the conflict does not seem to have seriously affected the country's morale. Fifty-three percent think that the strikes will remain limited to public services. It is true that it is not those worst off who are on strike. The private sector has good reasons for not following the example of those who enjoy job security. And a majority of answers (55 percent) is wagering on a rapid end to the present movement.

In short, the results of this poll carried out while the situation continues are reassuring. Contrary to the allegations of politicians of the left, public opinion as a whole approves the protest of users of public services. The government can take satisfaction from that. So can Francois Mitterrand. Fifty-eight percent state that the head of state was right to receive a delegation of striking railway workers on 1 January at Fort De Bregancon. Against all expectations, French people give their approval to cohabitation.

### I. Abuse of the Right to Strike

Question: Do you think that the present strikes in public services represent:

	A normal exercise of the right to strike?	An abuse of the right to strike?	No opinion
Total: 100%	37	55	8
<b>Head of Household's Sector of Activity</b>			
--Self-employed . . . . .	100%	18	73
--Employee . . . . .	100%	45	47
in the private sector . . . . .	100%	39	52
in the public sector . . . . .	100%	58	37
<b>Political Allegiance</b>			
--Communist party* . . . . .	100%	69	20
--Socialist party . . . . .	100%	58	34
--UDF . . . . .	100%	14	81
--RPR . . . . .	100%	16	77
<b>Size of Town or City</b>			
--Less than 2,000 inhabitants . . . .	100%	26	65
--2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants . . . .	100%	38	51
--20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants . . . .	100%	37	57
--More than 100,000 inhabitants . . . .	100%	41	50
--City of Paris . . . . .	100%	50	46

\*Because of the small number of these, the results should be interpreted with caution.

## II. Political Strikes

Question: Do you think that the present public service strikes are being conducted:

	<u>Percent</u>
In defense of vocational interests? . . . . .	40
For political reasons? . . . . .	49
No opinion . . . . .	11
Total . . . . .	100

## III. Impossible to Increase Salaries

Question: The government maintains that it cannot satisfy the demand for an increase in public service salaries because to do so would compromise the economic recovery. Do you agree or do you disagree with this point of view?

	<u>Percent</u>
Agree . . . . .	50
Disagree . . . . .	36
No opinion . . . . .	14
Total . . . . .	100

## IV. The Government Should Requisition the Strikers

Question: What should the government's approach be in handling the strike?

	Government should make more con- cessions to strikers.	Government should re- quisition strikers to assure minimum service.	Government should wait for strikers to return to work on their own.	No opinion
Total: % <sup>1</sup>	36	46	20	8
<b>Sex:</b>				
Men . . . . .	38	45	22	6
Women . . . . .	33	47	18	11
<b>Age:</b>				
18-24 years of age . . . . .	43	38	29	7
25-34 years of age . . . . .	40	44	22	7
35-49 years of age . . . . .	33	56	17	4
50-64 years of age . . . . .	34	45	17	11
65 years of age and over . . . . .	30	43	18	13

Government should make more con- cessions to strikers.	Government should re- quisition strikers to assure minimum service.	Government should wait for strikers to return to work on their own.	No opinion
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**Head of Household's**

**Profession:**

Farmer . . . . .	16	52	25	15
Craftsman, trader, business head . . . . .	24	67	15	10
Salaried staff, higher academic profession . . . . .	31	53	25	--
Intermediate profession and employees: . . . . .	43	47	18	5
Intermediate profession . . . . .	44	50	15	1
Employees . . . . .	42	42	22	10
Laborer . . . . .	40	41	23	7
Inactive, retired . . . . .	33	42	18	13

**Head of Household's Sector  
of Activity**

Self-employed . . . . .	22	58	21	10
Salaried position . . . . .	39	46	21	6
Salaried position in the private sector . . . . .	35	52	20	6
Salaried position in the public sector . . . . .	47	34	22	6

**Political Loyalty**

Communist Party* . . . . .	54	22	13	11
Socialist Party . . . . .	55	33	19	6
UDF . . . . .	18	64	20	8
RPR . . . . .	19	56	29	7

<sup>1</sup>The total of the percentages comes to more than 100 because the people questioned may have given two answers.

\*Because of the small number of these, the results should be interpreted with caution.

## V. Main Complaint: Electricity

Question: At the moment, what bothers you most about the strikes?

	<u>Percent</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Rank</u>
Cuts in gas . . . . .	3	6
Cuts in electricity . . . . .	59	1
The SNCF strikes . . . . .	18	2
The urban transport strikes . . . . .	10	4
The traffic jams . . . . .	6	5
The mail . . . . .	13	3
No answer . . . . .	18	

<sup>1</sup>The total of the percentages comes to more than 100 because the people questioned may have given two answers.

## VI. The Strike Movement Will Remain Limited to Public Services

Question: In your opinion, will the strike movement:

	<u>Percent</u>
Remain limited to public services? . . . . .	53
Or will it spread to the private sector? . . .	31
No opinion . . . . .	16
Total . . . . .	100

## VII. The Strikes are Coming to an End

Question: Do you think that the strike movement in public services will continue for a long time yet, or do you think it will soon come to an end?

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Political Loyalty (in percent)</u>			
		<u>PC*</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>UDF</u>	<u>RPR</u>
It will continue for a long time yet . . . . .	31	39	39	32	30
It will soon end . . . . .	50	44	47	51	46
No opinion . . . . .	19	27	14	17	24
Total . . . . .	100	100	100	100	100

\*Because of the small number of these, the results should be interpreted with caution.

## VIII. The Right to Strike Should Not be Denied

Question: With regard to the right to strike in public services, do you think the government should:

	<u>Percent</u>
Deny it? . . . . .	9
Restrain it? . . . . .	37
Maintain it as at present? . . . . .	48
No opinion . . . . .	6
Total . . . . .	100

## IX. Yes to the Bregancon Interview

Question: Mitterrand received a delegation of striking railway workers on 1 January at Fort Bregancon. Do you think:

	<u>Percent</u>
That he was right because he established a dialogue? . . . . .	58
That he was wrong because he added fuel to the fire? . . . . .	24
No opinion . . . . .	18
Total . . . . .	100

[item in box]

Sofres Technical Information

--Poll taken for LE FIGARO

--Poll date: 9, 10 January 1987

--National sample of 800 individuals representative of the French population as a whole 18 years of age and older.

--Telephone inquiry carried out according to the quota method (sex, age, head of household's profession PCS), and stratification according to area and category of town or city.

9824

CSO: 3519/59

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

AEGEAN MINISTRY APPOINTMENT--General Dhimitrios Matafias, retired commander of the Cyprus National Guard, has been appointed secretary general of the Ministry of the Aegean. [Text] [Athens ELEVATHEROTIPIA in Greek 14 Jan 87 p 5 NC] /8309

CSO: 3521/67

## FORTMAN, BECKERS DEBATE FUTURE OF RADICAL PARTY

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 21 Nov 86 pp 9-15

[Interview with PPR [Political Party of Radicals] leaders Bas de Gaay Fortman and Ria Beckers, in Utrecht, in connection with the party congress, by Gerard Driehuis and Tom-Jan Meeus: "Bas de Gaay Fortman and Ria Beckers in Debate: 'The PPR Must No Longer Be Pitiful"'; date not given; ellipses as in original; first paragraph is DE TIJD introduction]

[Text] Once, in the far distant past, the PPR did very well in the elections: Bas de Gaay Fortman led the party to seven seats in 1972. Now, after the party has done poorly in many elections under the leadership of Ria Beckers, De Gaay Fortman is going to try again--in the elections for the Provincial States and the First Chamber: "I'm a very capable opponent for Lubbers." And if it does not work out? Will the PPR then dissolve itself? A debate between the two main players: "No! Nonsense." "Bas, just shut your mouth for once."

"Ria" and "Bas". Not "Mrs" Beckers and "Mr" De Gaay Fortman, and still less "Beckers" and "Fortman". As they sit there, the two of them side by side, in a cold, remote classroom in a Utrecht school, discussing the future of their (little) party, that is who they are.

Ria and Bas.

Last week, the latter sowed panic in the PPR ranks when he spoke in the First Chamber about "consequences" that the party must consider if it achieves the same--mediocre--results in the coming States elections as in the last Second Chamber elections. The obvious conclusion was that in that case, the party ought to dissolve itself.

It was, as they say almost affectionately in the PPR, "typical Bas." The party had already been discussing its campaign strategy for some time, but suddenly, without the slightest warning, there is Bas with "his" strategy. Not a soul knew of it beforehand. In the Second Chamber faction, the reaction was angry. The party leader, who by now has a great deal of experience with her party colleague's solo acts: "No, I won't say what my very first reaction was. I don't think that would be wise."

Nonetheless, last Saturday Bas won over the PPR congress, which decided to do it the way he wanted, although the congress did not support his point of view regarding dissolution. Once again he had it all figured out. Under his leadership, the PPR will campaign outright for a crushing defeat: Its aim is to win no fewer than three seats in the First Chamber. To put it in party terminology: the "three-plus-three strategy."

The PPR congress decided on Saturday to keep things friendly and act as if there were no conflict. But there is. To be or not to be--and why that is a difficult question. The debate between two friendly antagonists.

[Question] Let's get right down to brass tacks: Is the PPR going to be dissolved or not?

Ria: Dissolution of the PPR is not on the agenda.

Bas: Now, what did I say? If the club achieves the same results in March as it did in May in the Second Chamber elections, then that will have consequences. We got 1.3 percent in May. That would mean that we wouldn't have a single seat in 8 of the 12 Provincial States. In the other 4 we'd still have one seat. And we'd no longer be represented in the First Chamber. It would be insane then for the club to say: That was good, we'll do better next time. We cannot do that. That has consequences for the question of how we're to carry on. I didn't use the word "dissolution," but we really will have to talk things over: Things cannot go on like that.

[Question] That's splitting hairs. There's not much of a third choice between going on as a party and not going on. Going on a little bit is not a possibility.

Bas: Don't we still have 5,000 members? The crazy thing about what I'm saying is that somebody who wants to be a candidate is explaining how bad things are. That's not normal. You hear them saying how well things are going. But I want to sound the alarm. And campaign on that basis.

[Question] But why did the term "dissolution" come up?

Bas: Because that looks better in a newspaper headline. But DE VOLSKRANT, which was the first to write that, didn't talk with me.

Ria: That's right, Bas, but it did talk with me. I told the reporter, "Look, Bas was talking about 'consequences' and not about 'the consequences.'" DE VOLSKRANT then interpreted those consequences as meaning "dissolution." And I have to say: if a politician talks about consequences, it's logical to interpret that as meaning dissolution. And Bas is very well aware of that.

Bas: How so?

[Question] You must see that too. There's no third choice besides going on and not going on. You cannot go on a little bit as a political party.

Bas: No, ah, yes, no...

Ria: Maybe I could put things in a different perspective. It's looking as if we'll be having that discussion only if the States elections turn out badly. But of course we've been holding that discussion for a long time now. Bas didn't invent that discussion. Of course even after the Second Chamber elections we saw that it couldn't go on like that. Bas focused on the First Chamber and the States elections. We'd been working to find ways and means long before Bas came out with his comments; it's just that this incident has come up.

Bas: Christiaanse, the CDA faction chairman in the First Chamber, called it an electoral show.

[Question] Was it?

Bas: What Christiaanse realized and an awful lot of people didn't is that I was speaking directly to the voters. Every MP has the right to speak directly to the voters. I get my power from the voters, not from the PPR. The PPR put me on the ballot, but I get my power from the voter. After sitting in the First Chamber for 10 years, I have the right to say to the voters: "It can't go on like this any longer; I've had enough of this talk about that nice PPR and the fine new ideas, when at the same time people don't vote for me."

[Question] Nicely put. But, Mrs Beckers, Mr De Gaay Fortman's threat of dissolution has surrounded the PPR with the stench of the grave. Doesn't seem to us to be the best way to win votes.

Bas: No! Nonsense...

Ria: Bas, just shut your mouth for once, they're asking me.

Bas didn't speak to the voters only for campaign reasons. People can't vote meaningfully any more, because all the large parties are coming to resemble one another more and more. Bas says, "I'm talking to the voters." I think that's right. But what Bas forgets is that we have our supporters. And if an individual, whatever his record of service may be, raises the specter of dissolution in the name of the party, that clings to all the PPR municipal council members too. They often serve alone, just like Bas. And they do keep their end up.

[Question] So "stench of the grave" is right?

Ria: No, I'm not talking about dissolution, but the fact is, we either go up or we go under. We're also working on other possibilities to win over people besides the certified party cadres.

Bas: But that just isn't happening. We've got to give the PVDA an incredible kick, so that in 1990 the voter will have a choice between this gang or an entirely new one, as he does in many other countries. The PVDA says, "The whole gang in power today is wrong, but even so, after the elections we'll form a coalition with half of that gang."

[Question] Was that talk about dissolution just as big a surprise for Mrs Beckers as for the others?

Ria: Ah... let me put it like this: we were discussing things, so I did know something of what Bas intended. What came as a surprise to me was that all of a sudden he just said all that.

[Question] Not too pleasant.

Ria: Oh, pleasant or not pleasant is not really the question.

[Question] Were you very angry?

Ria: Who knows? Bas has his own view of how we divide up the work. He thinks, "I'll look after the voters, and Ria will take care of the members and the party." He sometimes abuses that view a bit... But I'm used to that.

[Question] You've said more than once, "Bas is a soloist."

Ria: You can say that again.

Bas: Now, Ria, people say it's getting better.

Ria: Yes, of course, Bas, it is going somewhat better.

[Question] And then all at once, a solo performance dissolving the party.

Bas: She knew how I felt. Right after the Second Chamber elections I said, "I've had enough of this." Not of the PPR people, still less of our ideas. But I've had enough of our failure at winning votes. That has to stop.

I'm not interested in campaigning for the First Chamber with the goal that if we just do our best, then maybe Bas will stay in the First Chamber. I won't do it on those terms any more.

Ria: We'd agreed on that, but of course that talk about dissolution went considerably further.

Bas: It's talk about revival. For the goal of having three seats in the First Chamber and three seats in all the States, for that goal I'm sticking my neck out. If we get two seats, people will consider us the big winner. That would mean we'd almost doubled our supporters. But for me that would be too little. I'm going to the voters with the line that they mustn't think the PPR will carry on until the last person turns out the light and shuts the door behind him. If they think we're worthwhile, they'll just have to vote for us. I want to sound the alarm.

[Question] Wouldn't it have been smarter to talk with the party first, before sounding that kind of alarm?

Bas: Congresses don't sound any alarms.

[Question] Suppose the party wins only one Senate seat.

Bas: In that case the party will say it's awfully nice, but it will be too little for me.

[Question] So you wouldn't occupy the seat in that case?

Bas: Of course I would. If I were certain that it would be one seat, I wouldn't be a candidate. I've sat there alone for years now; I don't have to do it any longer.

[Question] A nice prospect for the potential PPR voter: The person elected serves out of a feeling of duty. A suggestion: If you think three senators is the minimum necessary to function properly, then you take third place on the list. Actually very simple, isn't it?

Bas: Yes, but in that case I can't head the list.

[Question] Does that matter?

Bas: Somebody has to head the list. It's just that I think after 10 years of being in a slump, we have the right to ask the voters to give us the opportunity to play our role: To be the salt in the porridge of the progressive majority.

Ria: Bas is adequately motivated and so will head the list. But I think it would be adequate if we had at least one representative in all the States. To achieve that, we don't have to do all that much better than in May.

Bas: That's not true, Ria. The difference between your goal and our present vote is equivalent to a whole seat in the Chamber. We've...

[Silence. He looks at the trousers of his Kaunda suit, horrified: "Darn, what's that..." And he continues to stare, more and more mournfully.]

Ria, concerned: What is it, Bas?

Bas, with a very nasty look: Chewing gum. I'm sitting on chewing gum.

Ria: That's what happens, Bas, when you sit on the teacher's chair.

[We laugh too hard.]

Bas: I do not think that's nice. I don't think that's nice at all. Of course it was meant for the teacher. No, not nice.

[He picks at his trouser during the rest of the conversation. But back to business.]

Bas: What we really have to do is modify the political culture. No more sub-amendment 6cB party.

[Question] The same thing D'66 is aiming at.

Bas: D'66 is only there to win votes. They're only there to applaud the leader.

[Question] That's somewhat harder here, because who's the leader?

Ria, fiercely: Just ask the congress that.

Bas, who is less and less inclined to pay attention to our questions: Another point that we have to change is our marketing. That has to improve. We have to approach the voters aggressively. You can also campaign defensively: "Oh, voter, don't you think it would be pitiful if the PPR was no longer represented in most of the States and in the First Chamber? Poor Bas de Gaay Fortman would have to leave the Chamber. Isn't that pitiful?" We mustn't do it like that. You can also go on the offensive: "If you think we're so good, then it's high time you voted for us."

[Question] Is that implicit criticism of how the chairwoman of the Second Chamber faction has campaigned in the past?

Bas: No, I don't think you can use this strategy in every election.

[Question] But you said there's a marketing problem. That was directed at Ria Backers, wasn't it?

Bas: I feel that you've got a different situation in Second Chamber elections, because every time, the CDA and the PVDA come out swinging at each other. At a time like that, it's very hard for our party to stay in the picture.

[Question] Naturally that won't change in the next elections.

Bas: It puts you under ab-so-lute-ly awful pressure when the PVDA says, "Your vote for a small party is wasted." And they can't do that in States and First Chamber elections. No cabinet is formed on the basis of those results.

[Question] But that's different this round.

Bas: Yes, but we're in on it. Because nobody can say that we don't belong to the progressive majority. Did you mean to say that? That we're going to keep Lubbers in power? Well then.

I would even go so far as to say in all immodesty that I'm a very capable opponent for Lubbers if the CDA and VVD lose their majority in the First Chamber.

Ria is laughing now--she looks sceptical: Now I just want to say a few things. In the first place, that we did not campaign defensively in the Second Chamber elections. And that it was a good campaign. Yes, even in marketing terms.

Bas: I think so too, I think so too!

[Question] It was just said that the marketing has to improve--therefore there was something wrong with it.

Bas: No, but...

Ria: Just let me talk now, Bas! You can give a whole speech on the PPR and the election results, but if you just take a look at all the problems, then we did very well in the campaign. And our campaign was ab-so-lute-ly not defensive.

[Question] Then what is it about the marketing that has to improve?

Bas: It's too bad for you, but I agree with what she said. In our campaign I'm not going to show people that I'm good at tug of war or sailing or hockey. No.

Ria: I just want to say, that's a relief.

[Question] And now what was wrong with the marketing?

Bas: In and of itself, there was nothing wrong with it, but the problem was that what we had to say was constantly swamped by what the PVDA was saying: "If you don't vote for us, it'll mean a second Lubbers cabinet." That's what they said, day in and day out. And that poured out over people who don't think much politically, because that's true of the vast majority of voters--people do think, but the vast majority of them don't think politically.

Ria: I think that's rather exaggerated: Of course people do think, but it's made impossible for them to make good choices--that's an entirely different matter. The picture of politics that people are fed on TV, for instance--that's supposed to be politics. Oh well...

[Question] Of course, that happens because all those politicians are thinking first and foremost about marketing.

Ria: Preciesly. I agree with you on that.

Bas: And are we supposed to say, "We won't do that"?

[Question] But we were just told that the marketing has to improve. How?

Bas: Now, look. The time has come to play tough. That's what you're doing when you sound the alarm, that's what you're doing when you say three-plus-three. Then each voter is confronted with the question: "Well, do we want the PPR now, or do we not want it?" In the last elections in the schools we didn't get any votes. The young people who voted for Lubbers didn't know that the PPR even existed. But we want them all to know that they can vote for the PPR.

[Question] But that tough talk is a bit doubtful, because Ria Beckers says it won't come to that, the PPR is not talking about dissolution for the time being, and certainly not in connection with the States elections.

Bas: Ria says that with one seat in all the States and one in the First Chamber, we'll have done reasonably well. And I say that's much too little.

[Question] Oh? And what if you fail?

Bas: I'm speaking for myself, not for the party. But if I can't say that, then they mustn't choose me to head the list in December. But it's OK with Ria for me to say it.

Ria: Of course, you can say that. But what I'm saying is this: If we don't achieve Bas's goal and we get one seat everywhere, then I don't expect the party to start discussing dissolution. In that case we'll be on the path upward.

Bas: And I'm saying, with three, we're barely out of the slump.

[Question] The PPR was always the party of clarity before the elections. So the logical question is: What if the goal is not met?

Bas: In that case, you'll speak to me after the elections and say: "We thought you were a reasonably good politician and could make a good assessment of whether your goals were realistic or not." In that case, you'll realize that I'm less good than you originally thought.

[Question] So it's like this: When it comes to planning strategy, Bas does it for the party, and when the strategy has failed, the party has to solve the problem for Bas.

Bas: But you can't force consequences on me if I don't accept them.

[Question] But what consequences did you have in mind then last week?

Bas: That's a moot point. My text didn't read "must have"; it read "has."

Ria: It read "will have."

[Bas will have none of it. We muddle on.]

[Question] But based on the statements now being made by the person heading the list for the First Chamber elections, isn't it logical to assume that he will start a discussion of the party's future at the first party meeting after the elections?

Ria: He has a right to do so, doesn't he?

[Question] But he doesn't want to.

Bas: I'm not saying now that I will do it.

[It's all terribly clear.]

Bas: Before the European elections in 1984, when I saw that there were all kinds of parties that could never get the necessary 4 percent, each one on its own, I sent out a green feeler. That was successful and also a nasty failure. It led to a green progressive accord and an independent green group, and that ended up divided again. There was a split. In the last elections it was all over: 0.2 percent.

But you can see from that that I'm always working on the question of whether we'll be represented. Because voters don't go along with us in order to profess the PPR faith. Our voters want influence.

[Question] But the way the green list was presented back then reminds us a bit of what happened this week in the First Chamber--Bas de Gaay Fortman has an idea about what needs to be done and lets loose without anybody knowing anything about it.

Bas: Well yes but ...

[Question] Ria Beckers once said about this: "Bas enjoys that kind of thing. He was really born for it."

Bas: But...

Ria: That's right, too, isn't it? You are that way, aren't you?

Bas: No, what I enjoy is not having to be passive any more. I very much hope that they'll make me number one, and then the party will know, and then I'll know that it won't be a passive campaign. And OK, I enjoy it.

[Question] A former faction staffer explained this latest kamikaze operation to us: Under Den Uyl, Bas got a whiff of power, and Ria didn't, because she had to run the party, and now Bas is trying to get close to power one more time.

Bas: Well, things are not so bad in the First Chamber. The one who really has got the tough job is Ria...

Ria: I agree with you about that.

Bas: ...because in the first Chamber they listen to one another, you don't stand there and talk to empty seats when you represent a small party. So I have a much easier time of it.

[Question] People have gotten the idea that the PPR is once again being led by Bas de Gaay Fortman. You give the voters an ultimatum: Announce the possible dissolution of the party, quite on your own and against the desire of the congress; and yet the congress applauds loudly.

Bas: If they choose me to head the list on 13 December, then I can head the list. And that's head, not lead. Ria is the leader.

[Question] You don't feel threatened?

Ria: Not in the least.

[Question] But suppose this campaign of Bas's works. That he brings home those three Senate seats. Then he'll have done considerably better than you in the past six campaigns. That can't help but have consequences. If the "Van Mierlo of the PPR" brings home the bacon, that can't help but look dismal for you, Mrs Beckers.

Bas: The PPR has never asked me to head the list for the Second Chamber again. And if they were to ask, my answer would be clear: "No." I function better in the First Chamber than in the Second.

[Question] Is your "no" as clear as Van Mierlo's was 2 years ago?

Bas: With me it's somewhat clearer.

Ria: That's irrelevant. The party definitely will not ask Bas. That's over and done with.

Bas: The party's very satisfied with Ria.

Ria: And Bas too.

[Question] But if the campaign succeeds, people will immediately get the idea that Bas can do it and Ria can't.

Ria: In that case, Bas can just try the Second Chamber once! Second Chamber elections are simply much tougher. Success in First Chamber elections doesn't mean that you'll be successful in Second Chamber elections.

[Question] But a difficulty could arise between you two.

Ria: I'm very good at solving difficulties.

[Question] How?

Ria: Are you trying to get me to say that somebody will have to go?

[So things have to change. A different strategy, a different person to head the list. But what exactly went wrong with the PPR? Why was the fine electoral success of 1972--seven seats under the leadership of... Bas--never repeated? And what about that inaccurate image?]

[Question] In 1977, even before the elections, you rejected the CDA as a coalition partner, so that every voter was very well aware that the PPR would not share power any more.

Bas: That was too early, that was stupid, that was wrong. They let themselves be carried away by anger.

Ria: There's a definite difference of opinion between Bas and me about that. But now we're not ruling out any party any more. What we do want for the elections is to aim at a whole new team of ministers, with a new program. Since 1977 we've never done anything else.

[Question] But then it was too late. Then the party had been decimated. And that hasn't changed since then.

Bas: Right, since then we've been in a deep slump. We're still for a progressive majority.

[Question] But you're reduced to a party that can only bear witness.

Bas: That's not intrinsic to the nature of the party, it comes from a lack of support from voters. It's not our role to be moderate. We have to pull. Large parties always want to be moderate. The PVDA always wants to be as close as possible to the CDA. Voters in Britain can choose a completely new team from time to time, in France and Germany too. I'm firmly convinced that the Netherlands voter wants the same in 1990. After all the affairs and rows, after Van Aardenne and Brokx, the center wants things cleaned up too. It's just that the voter doesn't get that choice. That's because of the PVDA. After each failed election strategy, they just shift closer over to the CDA!

[Question] What really struck us about the decision-making at the congress is that it went pretty flexibly and in a rather un-Leftist manner. Motions were withdrawn quietly, the discussion lasted a strikingly short time--although the First Chamber elections were a not insignificant issue.

Ria: It's also less unorganized than everybody thinks. You could see that for yourselves.

Bas: The image doesn't necessarily agree with reality. After all, did you see a single goat's wool stocking?

[Question] No, but to be honest, we really didn't look for them.

Bas: Did you see a single dog?

[Question] Yes, just one.

Ria: But if you saw one, we'll be stuck with that image for another 3 years. Well, that's life of course.

Bas: What has to change is our image as a small party that's nice and interesting but that you don't have to vote for. People mustn't think that any more as they see us at work.

Ria: But to some extent that's already changed.

Bas: For the thoughtful voter, yes. For the politically thoughtful voter.

Ria: For people from the peace movement and that kind of people.

Bas: The ones who follow politics. Look, after all, the people who vote for us--they already know that. But what we need is for people who are somewhat less convinced, for those people to vote PPR rather than CDA or VVD.

[We're done. We put the cassette recorder in the bag.]

Bas: What should I do about that chewing gum on my trousers, Ria?

Ria: Now, Bas, I'm not very good about housekeeping. I think you have to put an iron on it, but I'm not certain about that... (Pointing to the streaks that have spread over his trousers:) You'll just have to cut them off.

[That's them, Ria and Bas.]

12593

CSO: 3614/18

## COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS MAINTAINS REFORMIST COURSE

Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch 8 Dec 86 p 3

[Report by editorial staff: "Composition of New CPN Party Executive is Defeat for Old Liners--'Marxist' List of Candidates Rejected"; first paragraph is DE VOLSKRANT introduction]

[Text] Amsterdam--After a week of great uncertainty the CPN has elected a new party executive. Former Chairperson Elli Izeboud was reelected in the party executive of 55 members, as were former members of the chamber Ina Brouwer, Marius Ernsting and Evelien Eshuis. The result of the election means a defeat for the so-called "old liners." This Marxist-Leninist minority in the CPN is resigning itself to its loss.

Missing from the new executive are former Amsterdam councilwoman Tineke van de Klinkenberg and former parliamentary group leader in the Second Chamber Marcus Bakker, who resigned voluntarily. The party executive will decide later on the new chairperson. Izeboud is available again.

The CPN congress met for 3 days last week on order to make decisions on the direction of the party, which disappeared from the chamber during the recent Second Chamber elections. The representatives parted in great confusion last Sunday, after having argued about the composition of a new party executive.

The districts of Groningen, northern North Holland, Drenthe and a part of Amsterdam at that time opposed a candidate list of a committee from the party executive. The recalcitrant districts demanded more of their own candidates in the executive in order to achieve a better reflection of the various currents in the party. The Marxist wing also includes the task force on Marxism and Class Struggle which was to furnish the candidates.

## Relief

The old liners see nothing in the "renewed" CPN in which democratization and feminization occupy a central position. They want to return to the centrally led party which sees Marxism-Leninism as the only starting point. Part of the old liners split off from the party a few years ago and formed the Alliance of Communists in the Netherlands (VCN).

Last week the representatives decided to adjourn the congress and to continue a week later. The Groningen representative Geert Lameris repeated his big objections to the old party executive on Sunday in the Amsterdam headquarters of the CPN. According to Lameris, who acts as the main spokesman of the old liners, the former executive did not involve itself enough in political analyses and actions. According to him, the party executive had not been capable enough of "solving splits."

On behalf of the discontent districts, he submitted an alternative list of candidates with more Marxists and fewer members of the former party executive. Thus the names of Ina Brouwer and Evelien Eshuis were struck off. A broad majority of the congress paid no attention to the alternative list at all, however, and left the recommendation of the candidate committee practically untouched. At the start of the additional congress day, Lameris announced he would not assign any consequences to a defeat. This was a relief to many CPN members who feared a new splinter group might form.

Immediately after the election the Groningen representatives left the congress, so that they did not attend the result of the election. Delegate Joop Knukkel from northern North Holland, who adhered to their view, stayed on and stated after the election result: "We feel misunderstood. Now that our wing is not adequately represented in the party executive, internal problems will continue to exist. We will have to strengthen our organization as a Marxist wing and we must get into the limelight more."

A happy Ernsting stated at the end that the congress stuck with the old party executive "straight through all the storms." "That is an enormous result," he said. According to Ernsting, CPN members will have to come through more emphatically in actions against the "apparently powerful" Lubbers II cabinet. Plans for that will be made at a "socioeconomic action deliberation" on 10 January.

8700  
CSO: 3614/27

## KOK'S ACTIONS AS LABOR PARTY FLOOR LEADER CRITICIZED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 19 Dec 86 p 9

[Report by staff commentator J.M.Bik: "PvdA Parliamentary Group Leader W.Kok Subject of Concern"]

[Text] When someone without experience has to lead the opposition in the Second Chamber as chairman of a group of 52, it isn't surprising that he makes a little mistake now and then. When, however, both his political opponents and his associates in the Chamber start wondering whether he can keep hold of the reins when it counts, reason for concern arises. As the new PvdA leader, Kok must see to it that he does not become the subject of such concern.

In the matter of the legal or non-legal approach to the pension rights of the widow Rost van Tonningen, in which parliamentary executive member Alders thought it proper, in a first closed consultation, to give Minister Van Dijk a green light for the latter's view against modifying the law, there was considerable surprise the following week about the obviously very rapid change in the PvdA group's voting pattern. But last month it could still be said that what happened to the leadership of the PvdA parliamentary group also happened in other groups.

This week there was a new surprise, however. The PvdA parliamentary group not only opposed--unexpected to many--the potential supply of RDM [Rotterdam Drydock Company] submarines to Saudi Arabia, but it moreover manifested an image of strong discord. Even before the vote on an individual PvdA motion, annoyed parliamentary group members (ten of them), some of whom not unimportant, gave their own deviating opinions to anyone willing to listen. And thus journalists traditionally specializing in CDA dissensions now had a different adventure.

## Informal Consultation

On Friday last week around lunchtime and right before the cabinet was to decide on the granting of an export permit for supplying the submarines, Prime Minister Lubbers received the parliamentary group chairmen of the PvdA, CDA, VVD and D'66 for a last informal consultation at the Department of Public Affairs. Perhaps Opposition Leader Kok (PvdA) was already at that time opposed to the granting of that export permit. Perhaps he also knew already

then that an ample majority of his Second Chamber parliamentary group was against it.

His four discussion partners in any event had not understood it that way. That became clear in the Chamber debate on the matter yesterday from the irritated reactions to the negative standpoint that a majority of the PvdA parliamentary group turned out to have. If Kok had thus warned them about that on Friday or during the previous weeks of repeated informal consultation, he either was not very clear or he continuously spoke with a foursome of very bad listeners. Neither situation is a pleasant conclusion.

Yesterday irritation was especially great in the CDA, where only last weekend the first signs had appeared indicating that the majority of the PvdA group would probably vote in opposition after all (as indeed happened in its closed meeting the day before yesterday by a 25-15 vote). In October attempts were started by Prime Minister Lubbers and the parliamentary group chairmen of the four large parties to work cautiously toward agreement via informal advance consultation with reference to a "project of national importance," as it is seen in competing countries. Or in any event to avoid a polarizing discussion as happened a few years ago in the affair of the submarines for Taiwan. The project was a matter--and still is--of about 3.7 billion [guilders] and 15,000 man years of high technology work. And it was a matter of yes or no, but then preferably without internationally damaging political fireworks.

Until last week those attempts, intensified in November after initial reports in the media, seemed so successful. But this week, in view of yesterday's chamber debate, they proved to have failed in great part after all. Bitter criticism of Kok was voiced in the CDA, and he was scornfully remembered for his recent invitation to the parliamentary groups for a constructive dialogue (at the beginning of October, in the general debate). But even in D'66 it was casually pointed out that everyone could have been aware of the fact that the final bid date for RDM was 15 December and that it was not at all a good idea to make objections after the cabinet had decided on an export permit.

#### Precisely

Countering the economic interest of the RDM shipyard and the Rhine estuary area, amongst others, the Cabinet and the Chamber had to weigh the security of Israel and the acceptability of Saudi Arabia as an arms customer. Who can blame anyone that such weighing gives different results (for example, negative with respect to the supplying). But then--in the interest of the country's position of course--let it be at the right time and place, if at all possible. And just that possibility had been offered very precisely by Lubbers and his associates.

Speaking on the small Gulf of Aqaba facing the port of Eilat, Minister Van den Broek was actually more convincing, to a chamber majority including 10 PvdA members, with respect to Israeli security than the PvdA spokesman, who saw potential security problems for Israel north of the Saudi naval base of Jidda in the Red Sea. Subsequently Van den Broek hardly reacted at all to a second argument of the PvdA--namely that "many of us hesitate to tread the path of arms suppliers." That is a very honorable view which the PSP [Pacifist

Socialist Party], for example, would confirm (it already did so a few years ago when a decision was made, with the PvdA's agreement, to allow the supply of naval ships to the Iran of the Shah). But what can a Dutch Minister reply to that in a debate? Something like: Well, OK, let's just close down those naval shipyards then?

The motion by PvdA member Van den Bergh which was rejected yesterday will probably still play somewhat of a role in the election campaign in the Rhine estuary a few months from now, partly in view of that second argument yesterday. The youthful parliamentary group chairman Kok, who believes that at some time he should do political business with Lubbers and his party, might very well continue to be troubled by what happened yesterday. Lubbers might just as well tell Kok right now: At some time, but no longer with pleasure.

8700

CSO: 3614/27

## MORE ACTIVE RELATIONS WITH FORMER COLONIES ADVOCATED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Our Africa"]

[Excerpts] "The habit makes the monk."

When Mario Soares was prime minister, he was frequently accused of not paying proper attention to Portugal's relations with its former colonies.

Even more, he was accused of not understanding the place that the former colonies in Africa ought to occupy in Portugal's foreign policy and of concerning himself only with our country's ties with Europe.

And the truth is that during the periods corresponding to governments headed by Mario Soares, relations with the new Portuguese-speaking countries did not improve at all and may even have deteriorated.

But the situation has changed.

Soares was elected president of the republic.

And his first state visit abroad in the exercise of his new duties was made precisely to two former colonies in Africa.

That is the point that needs to be remembered in connection with the presidential visit to Sao Tome and Cape Verde.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with this visit is the distinction between words and actions.

It is one thing to talk about relations with the former African colonies--but it is something else to implement them.

And the truth is that 12 years after 25 April 1974, there is still a lot of talk about this subject--but almost nothing is ever done about it.

Portugal draws little benefit from the fact that it speaks the same language and is uniquely familiar with every inch of the territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. And those countries draw little benefit from the experience accumulated by the Portuguese during their stay in Africa.

There is knowledge that is in danger of being lost forever--and ingloriously.

The danger exists that as far as we are concerned, the former colonies will turn into new Brazils.

Visits are made, agreements are planned, and promises are lined up between Portugal and Brazil as well.

But the distance between the two nations never stops growing.

As is known, the Portuguese have an irresistible tendency toward nostalgia.

Decolonization and the stampede out of Africa fuel passionate discussions even today.

But when it comes to the new opportunities opened up by the emergence of five new nations that speak Portuguese, there has never yet been a serious debate on that subject.

It is necessary that nostalgia be balanced with pragmatism, efficiency, and a taste for the concrete.

11798

CSO: 3542/31

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

USSR PROPOSES COOPERATION FOR SAO TOME DEVELOPMENT

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 86 p 24

[Text] The president of the republic has told EXPRESSO that he is available for discussions with Moscow concerning a tripartite agreement on development for Sao Tome and Principe. The agreement was suggested to him by the Soviet ambassador to that country, Kuznetsov Vlatimir, during Mario Soares' visit to the archipelago a week ago.

According to some of those accompanying the president, the Portuguese party found the USSR's diplomatic representative to be quite open to cooperation with Lisbon in solving the serious economic and social problems affecting that small African country, which has a population of just over 90,000. One of the experts invited to make the trip with Soares disclosed that the ambassador had "admitted that Soviet aid in the agricultural area was leading nowhere in Sao Tome and that only the Portuguese were in a position to guarantee the archipelago's development in that area." The same source also said that Moscow would be interested in cooperating only in the service and fishing sectors.

The intentions announced by the Soviet diplomat contrast with the traditional hegemonic inclination manifested by the USSR in relation to the African continent, an inclination which reportedly included the islands of Sao Tome and Principe in their first decade of independence. But one of those accompanying the Portuguese president said that during a conversation with Vlatimir, the latter had assured him of the existence of "major changes" in Soviet foreign policy, one of which was being reflected in this manner.

The USSR has two satellite tracking radar installations in Sao Tome and Principe, but there are no visible signs in the archipelago of any progress made as a result of supposed Soviet aid. For its part, Angola--another officially Portuguese-speaking African country that is also traditionally close to Moscow--maintains a force of from 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers in Sao Tome for training purposes. But that fact did not prevent the Sao Tomeans and Portuguese from making some progress in the field of military cooperation (especially in the area of training) during the visit by Mario Soares.

It is very probable that the Soviet proposals will meet with a cool reception on the part of the Portuguese Government. On more than one occasion during Soares' visit, the secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Azevedo Soares--who was also part of the presidential party--told reporters that trilateral cooperation was not one of Lisbon's priorities for the African continent.

11798  
CSO: 3542/31

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

AZORES SEPARATISM ISSUE CAUSES DISBELIEF, ANGER

Bio Data on FLA Leader

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 22 Nov 86 p 5

[Text] The FLA leader, Jose de Almeida, will be sitting in the dock again as the defendant in a criminal proceeding for the 128th time. But who is this quixotic figure, a former ANP deputy who calls himself a "legitimate son of April" and who travels to "the capital of the Empire" to rail against "Portuguese colonialism?"

When he is called into court in the near future to answer the accusation that he is a traitor to the country in a criminal proceeding arising from a complaint filed by the government last Wednesday, it will be the 128th time that the leader of the Azores Liberation Front will assume the role of a defendant.

Acquitted the previous 127 times--by his own reckoning--Jose de Almeida was accused of abusing the freedom of the press while director of the newspaper O MILHAFRE, the voice of the Azorean separatists. "It's not our fault that there are no laws that protect us, he argues. Make them! Besides, why is it that an independence-seeking organization must be repressed, if a party like the monarchist party, whose platform calls for the end of the Republic, is legal?"

During the "long hot summer" of 1975, when many--such as Almeida Santos, Medeiros Ferreira, and Jaime Gama (the last two also Azoreans)--felt the separatist violence physically and in terms of their property, Jose de Almeida, who today advocates pacifist solutions, said that "if the Azores were on the Continent, I would be in the jungle..."

Jose de Almeida, 50, married and the father of six children, is the 18th child of a family of small farmers from the Brittany region of Sao Miguel. He is the only one of his brothers and sisters who attended school beyond the elementary level. He came to Lisbon at the age of 13. He fought in the militia in Angola.

After his military service, while finishing his university degree in history, he went to work in the Department of Strategic Information (2nd division) of the Ministry of Defense--a unit then under the command of Gen Venancio Deslandes, with whom he became friends.

His wife, then a Gulbenkian scholar, was a Viana do Castelo partisan. And it was from the social gatherings sympathetic to the regime in that electoral circle that he was elected deputy in 1969 on the ANP slate. "I believed in Marcelo Caetano, like many others of my generation," he explains.

April 25 took him by surprise in Lisbon, where he was secretary to the Parliamentary Committee on Defense, and witnessed the heated conversations between Spinola and Costa Gomes and the holder of that portfolio in the Caetano administration.

In October 1975 he returned to his native Azores and settled in Ponta Delgada. He took with him, he acknowledges, "a humanistic education and a rather continental view of politics."

The process of making the Azores politically and administratively autonomous, which has sprouted from liberal roots dozens of times in the past 150 years--sometimes with flags of independence unfurled--became radicalized very quickly in 1975 through opposition to the new authorities installed in Lisbon during the revolutionary period. And as founder of the FLA, Jose de Almeida went so far as to launch a self-styled "Clandestine Government of the Azores in Exile," with headquarters on the east coast of the United States, where the majority of the nearly 700,000 Azorean residents of the United States live. The paths of Mota Amaral, as he himself acknowledged some days ago, crossed with those of the FLA.

#### Conspiracy

The separatist conspiracy which, in the islands, led to several violent confrontations during that period, needed to become more international, and there were moments when its leaders became completely caught up in obscure foreign interests. By that time, militants of the so-called Organization of the Secret Army (OAS, a French group on the far right, created to oppose the independence movement in Algeria and several times involved in attempts to assassinate De Gaulle) were held to be the true "brains" behind Azorean separation. Two in particular were so regarded--Jean-Dennis Rainguard and Paul Bletiere.

Rainguard himself accompanied Jose de Almeida to several meetings with the Azorean community in the United States and provided him with contacts in the financial and official circles there. But, according to reports made by two American journalists (Strasse and McTigue) during an investigation of separatism, entitled "The Fall River Conspiracy," the support consisted of little more than promises from then Senator Strom Thurmond and Richard Allen, a former Reagan advisor.

In Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, American ambassador at the time, began to feel the weight of the separatist pressure, but advised Washington to pursue a moderate course. In fact, Senator Claiborne Pell, in an interview with DN, would later give assurances that the U.S. administration would not get involved in radical adventures, at least not in Portugal, which was seen as "an ally in a peaceful transition to democracy."

This relative indifference on the part of American officialdom would lead the FLA's O MILHAFRE to retract its claws for awhile. And it is no coincidence that Jose de Almeida tells us that "The street phase was over; starting in 1984 our fight has been waged in the political arena, in direct negotiation, without intermediaries, with the agencies of Portuguese sovereignty."

Would anyone like to negotiate with Jose de Almeida?

#### Alleged Military Implication

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Nov 86 pp 1, 24

[Excerpts] Certain sectors of the military, interested in exacerbating the conflict between the Continent and the Government of the Azores, may have helped FLA leader Jose de Almeida to travel to Lisbon, where he gave a press conference this week.

According to an Azorean source who requested anonymity, while in Lisbon Jose de Almeida was a guest in the home of Rainer Daenhardt, an antique dealer who has ties with the military, including high-ranking Army officers. Daenhardt's links with the Azores and the FLA are of long standing. The antique dealer had a role in establishing the bookstore that Jose de Almeida owns in the Azorean capital and has aided separatist activities.

According to sources contacted by EXPRESSO the FLA leader, who had remained in the shadows for some time, was in danger of being removed from his position in command of those who seek Azorean independence. The "operation" carried out in Lisbon would thus appear to be an effort to bring him back into the limelight, which would not be unrelated with the intention to exacerbate the friction between the Continent and the Azorean administration.

This episode would fit in with the "guerrilla warfare" climate that now prevails between the head of the Azorean Government and some sectors of the Armed Forces, which are offended by the fact that Mota Amaral opposed the appointment of a military man as a cabinet minister and has tried to force the military to fly the region's flag over the barracks--a circumstance that ultimately served to touch off the whole process that culminated in the Soares veto of the new Azores Statute.

De Almeida's press conference has already led the government to petition the Attorney General of the Republic to bring criminal charges of "treason against the Nation" against the FLA leader. The request to institute the proceedings was immediately sent to the police section of the judiciary branch, which ought shortly to proceed with its inquiry into the circumstances on which the present initiative is based. If the courts should actually convict the FLA leader under the accusation, he would have to serve a prison term of anywhere between 15 and 20 years. Note that the attorney general's office has decided to order that the

scope of the investigation be broadened to include the behavior and activities of citizens who might possibly be involved with the Azorean separatist movement.

We recall that in his press conference, Jose de Almeida stated that the Azorean separatists seek a "free enterprise, free market" system for the Azores, which means that they propose to make the island group independent. "That is why we want a separate country," added Jose de Almeida, before reaffirming that he had been holding "negotiations with sovereign bodies with a view to the independence of the Azores" since 1984.

#### Relations With U.S.

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Nov 86 p 12-R

[Commentary by Vicente Jorge Silva: "A Fable of Separatism"]

[Excerpt] Could there be any greater caricature than the pathetic spectacle provided us this week in Lisbon by the leader of a ghost separatist movement in the Azores--the FLA--surrounded by two Madeiran separatist sympathizers?

The importance that some newspapers attached to the event, and the particularly aggressive official reactions that followed it--suspiciously out of proportion to the burlesque atmosphere of the occurrence--showed to what extent the specter of island separatism excites the sensationalist provincialism of the press or the patriotic spirits of good Portuguese. Meanwhile, through Jose de Almeida, the shadow of Joao Bosco Mota Amaral, whom de Almeida accused of having drawn up the FLA manifesto during the turbulent era of the PREC, slipped in. The pitiful spectacle of Azorean "dissidence," with the episode about the cabinet minister and the altercation about the flags, was followed by the sycophantic scene staged by separatism at Jose de Almeida's press conference.

On the other hand the near spontaneity with which Alberto Joao Jardim received Pieter Botha, the South African president--a spontaneity in keeping with the frankness with which he confesses to preferring the "millions" to the "flags"--cannot be far, either, from an anecdotal premonition of the "freezing temperatures" of the authority of the State (confronted, in this case, with the "inescapable" reality of the Madeiran presence in South Africa).

It is the commanding presence of the Azorean community in the United States and the special geostrategic location of the archipelago that stimulate the allure of separatism that is projected on the other side of the Atlantic. Mota Amaral bets on the flags that would give him more weight and political influence in relations with the United States, while Jardim seeks to attract--using a short-term rationale which, therefore, excludes factors of political evolution in South Africa--Pretoria's Madeiran capital.

The islands today are the tip of the iceberg in a country that insists on an insular posture and makes relations between the Continent and the islands--aid, on another plane, between the country itself and the Portuguese communities scattered all over the world--an object of so many mutual mistakes and misunderstandings. The insular syndrome could presage a wave of regional and local resentments on the Continent itself if the old system of administrative "centralization"--now almost always associated with political ineffectiveness--persists. It was that model that encouraged and provided alibis for the separatist siren song or swindle in the islands--and it is that model that fosters the aggressive and backward provincialism that is so typical of the Portuguese interior.

The creation of the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira resulted, basically, from insufficient awareness of that centralizing logic. No one sought to set up a truly new dialogue between the Continent and the islands. The fact that the true significance of insular peculiarities--in cultural and psychological terms, led to a mutual "laxness" in the behavior between the regional authorities and the central authority. This permitted the formation in Madeira and the Azores of two genuine "political autarchies," where minor neighborhood disturbances or expressions of populist authoritarianism restrict the room for democratic coexistence. It is precisely that outdated model of democracy that could triumph over the patchwork quilt of a country that has been reduced to the absurdity of any futuristic fable of separatism.

#### FLA Leader's Motives Questioned

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 Nov 86 p 6

[Text] In the sequence of various controversial episodes involving the two autonomous regions, and perhaps attempting to take advantage of an opportunity for an exercise in self-promotion, an Azorean citizen turns up in Lisbon to call up a ghost that, despite some possibly justified suspicions, had been thought to be part of the modest historical archeology of the revolutionary period: separatism.

The spectacle--a sad one--was staged according to plan and even included the mandatory bomb scare at the chosen arena, perhaps to give the event a touch of drama that would lend it credibility. But although the effect of this childish ploy miscarried, since no one took it seriously, it must be acknowledged that the main objective of the scheme was fully achieved, perhaps even with results that the organizers never thought possible. If they came for publicity, as it seems obvious they did, they got plenty of it. In addition, they took away with them enough provocations to fuel their propaganda efforts for some time to come, since our courts are notoriously slow-moving.

Actually when--with remarkable determination and speed--it activated the legal mechanisms necessary to begin criminal proceedings against the self-proclaimed leader of the phantasmagoric Azores Liberation Front, the government was doing nothing more than its duty, it is true, but it

indirectly provided the advocates of independence with reasons for immediate satisfaction. It gave them an opportunity not only to prolong the effects of the operation staged on Wednesday, but also to invoke the ever-fruitful image of "the persecuted" in the minds of the less well prepared or less well-informed who, for that very reason, might be able to absorb the message or become easy prey for propaganda. Incidentally, the case under discussion merits a similar amount of reflection--and not only on the formal level, given the terms and basis of the separatist speech--on what has been done, some of it by all countries that have freedom of information, concerning the proper journalistic treatment of terrorism.

The independence movement in the autonomous regions had become diluted to such a point since the now-distant years of 1975 and 1976 that any chance of its resurgence was thought, until a few months ago, to have been eliminated. But it has come back, as we see, and it is important to explain why it has returned in this conspicuous and apparently well-orchestrated form and at this particular time.

This leader of the alleged FLA looks more like a lone wolf, representing only himself and a small group of friends, then the head of a movement organized to defend a cause. He appears, however--and only--at critical moments such as the fiery years of the revolution and, in a different way, the recent months of heated discussion concerning the Azores autonomy law, followed by the controversial positions taken by Jardim in connection with the visit of Botha to Madeira. The question to be asked is precisely whether the self-proclaimed leader exploits--and merely exploits--autonomist sentiments that are exacerbated in times of crisis, or whether, he instead expresses a true sentiment in favor of independence that is latent in significant sectors of the population.

Whether he is an effective leader of some organized clandestine movement, as he claims to be, or a lone wolf seeking public attention, the persistence with which he seeks an audience from time to time gives food for thought. And so a third hypothesis comes to mind: that he is simply an errand boy or hatchet man--in which case we would need to find out for what forces. Perhaps a judgment made from a point of perspective will help to clear up these and other questions.

12830/9604  
CSO: 3542/23

## COMMENTARY VIEWS HARD POLICY CHOICES FOR PSD'S CAVACO SILVA

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 86 p 2

[Commentary by Pedro d'Anunciacao: "Cavaco Must Choose Between Caretaking and Rupture"]

[Text] After a year of activity, and with the latest budget having been approved, Cavaco Silva's minority government seems doomed to act simply in a caretaker capacity. With the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] having decided to adopt a more vigorous opposition role, it will be more difficult for the prime minister to get any important bill through the Assembly of the Republic. The fact is that since he is averse to negotiations with other groups, Cavaco has never managed to make progress with major legislative initiatives, even when his relations with the PRD have been at their best. It should be recalled that even the somewhat more spectacular management moves--the closing of PETROQUIMICA, for example--have reportedly been blocked in Parliament. The only fundamental legislative bill to be approved during this period was the one dealing with internal security--and that was also the only instance in which the government was willing to negotiate with the opposition by withdrawing the most controversial features of its bill (and attempting to make up for its retreat through penal legislation).

The position taken by the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] in this phase is unimportant. Cavaco has already demonstrated on several occasions that he does not want to favor agreement with that party--nor would he draw any great benefit from doing so, at least unless the PRD were also a party to the agreement, because without the PRD he would still not have a parliamentary majority. That explains why, after seeing all its attempts to draw closer to the PSD [Social Democratic Party] fail, the CDS leadership announced this week that it does not intend to vote in favor of any motion of confidence that might be submitted by the prime minister. Adriano Moreira has probably realized, in fact, that even though the CDS faces a great probability of losing votes in early legislative elections, the only way to regain political influence is through precisely those same early legislative elections--provided that their result is to give his party and the PSD a majority in the Assembly of the Republic. If that happened, the Social Democrats would need the CDS deputies to guarantee that majority.

## Cavaco Resigned to Caretaker Role

In conclusion, one of two things will happen: either Cavaco Silva will resign himself to the role of simply being a caretaker in this situation and eschew basic measures and structural reforms, or he will choose to trigger a political crisis and move toward early elections. All indications are that the latter possibility fits in better with the prime minister's profile. The trouble is that it involves various risks and several restrictions.

First of all, there is a general conviction, and it is shared by the Social Democratic leader, that the voters will punish anyone who jeopardizes political stability and provokes a crisis at this point. Last year, the voters did not sacrifice the PSD, of which Cavaco had just become leader, for breaking up the central bloc. At that point, there was a yearning for any change that would block the growing deterioration in the standard of living--but even so, the PSD was unable to make great inroads among the center's voters. Now, with economic recovery a fact and economic conditions particularly favorable, triggering a crisis might be very poorly received. But since Cavaco is especially skillful at creating a climate of tension in relations with the Assembly of the Republic, he will certainly not find it impossible to discover a satisfactory means--from his point of view--of triggering a crisis. Especially since it is known that the PS [Socialist Party] is in no way prepared to take that initiative.

Moreover, there is always the risk that if early elections are held, the makeup of Parliament will stay as it is, with no appreciable changes--or at least that the PSD will still not have a parliamentary majority even in alliance with the CDS. In fact, the polls present that scenario as being highly probable, since the predicted electoral improvement for the PSD would occur basically at the expense of the CDS.

As a result, the only way to solve the problem would be to change the Election Law before triggering a crisis leading to elections. And the PSD is assigning high priority to a revision of the Election Law based on its draft Election Code, which was drawn up by the commission headed by Jorge Miranda. It is even believed that at the government level (where Durao Barroso, secretary of state for internal administration, has been dealing with the matter), there have been contacts with individuals linked to the Office of the President of the Republic (Joaquim Aguiar is the name being mentioned) and with the PS (represented by Luis Nunes de Almeida, judge of the Constitutional Court) for the purpose of reaching agreement on the matter. And although the PS is divided over this issue (some people feel that revision of the Election Law should be carried out immediately to take votes away from the PRD and give them to the big parties, while others claim that such an advantage is not worth the risk that the parliamentary majority might go to Cavaco Silva), the fact is that such revision is part of the Socialist action program, and Vitor Constancio has never ruled out its possibility as long as the proportional system is retained. Be that as it may, it is unlikely that Cavaco will move toward a political crisis before deciding whether or not it is feasible to amend election legislation.

## "Cavaco Left" Progressing in Lisbon

Meanwhile, a measure of agitation has broken out within the PSD since it became obvious that the PRD is distancing itself from the party. Jose Miguel Judice in particular has engaged in violent attacks on Fernando Nogueira, who is regarded as the leader of what might be called the "Cavaco Left." Nogueira can take pride in having won the JSD [Social Democratic Youth] in a dispute with the "Cavaco Right" (which received logistic support from the secretary general, Dias Loureiro). But Jose Miguel Judice has other reasons to be concerned about the deputy minister: the fact is that the Cavaco Left is now striving to take leadership of the Lisbon party district away from him--there has even been mention of Mira Amaral as a candidate for the spot (and although Mira Amaral has denied to us that he intends to be a candidate, it is probable that someone else from that area will soon emerge to lead the fight against Judice).

Judice is advancing at the head of the Cavaco Right (at a time when Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is choosing to keep a lower profile and when Santana Lopes and Durao Barroso, both in the government, are avoiding any stands which might be controversial or displease Cavaco). He is hoping, of course, to collect the dividends that might accrue from Cavaco's disillusionment with the PRD. But it is unlikely that Cavaco has in fact been deluded by the PRD--it is probable that he has simply taken the best possible advantage of the divisions in the opposition by deepening them. And at a time when he needs above all to capture votes from the Left, it is also unlikely that the Social Democratic leader wants to choke off the extreme leftwing of his own party. That may be why he has no longer been supporting those in the JSD who tried to identify themselves most closely with him. And he would not mind sacrificing people such as Antonio Maria Pereira and Rui Almeida Mendes (the men most likely to advocate a return to the Democratic Alliance formula).

11798  
CSO: 3542/31

## POLL RESULTS ON STANCE VIS-A-VIS ECONOMY, POLITICAL SITUATION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Jan 87 pp 1, 12-14

[Excerpts] As 1986 ends, Spaniards are bidding farewell to a decade of disenchantment, as shown by a poll taken for EL PAIS by the Domoscopia Institute on the society's outlook on life as 1987 begins. Only 10 percent of those interviewed express fear regarding the new year, compared with 70 percent who trust hopefully in the economic and living prospects. The sample discloses a higher degree of self-satisfaction in the Spanish society, and a level of expectation comparable to what it felt in 1976. The preferences of the majority lean toward summer as a season, Saturday as a day of the week, blue as a color, and rice and oranges as the most delectable dishes.

The feeling that the economy is improving increased 30 percent during the second half of 1986 alone; and, compared with the situation 2 years ago, this positive assessment has reached 100 percent, based on the poll taken among 1,200 persons over age 18 between 12 and 18 December. PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and PCE [Spanish Communist Party] voters, and office employees in both the public and private sectors, are the ones in the lead with this economic optimism toward 1987.

The poll reveals a recovery of the positive image of the Church, and greater social and political integration among Spaniards. On the other hand, the image of those governing has undergone deterioration.

## Spain's Outlook on Life

According to a poll taken for EL PAIS by the Demoscopia Institute, under the direction of sociologists Rafael Lopez Pintor and Jose Juan Tohaira, 70 percent of Spaniards view the new year optimistically. Between 12 and 18 December of last year, 1,200 persons over age 18 were asked about how they spent Christmas, their expectations for the year now beginning, their tastes, preferences, concerns, and life styles. The results show that Spaniards are a little more satisfied with their life style than in previous year, and have recovered the expectations for the future that they had during 1976, at the start of the transition, particularly in the realm of economic expectations. Nevertheless, all indicators point to a certain amount of deterioration in the perception

of the political situation, probably a result of the crises that have beset Popular Alliance [AP] and the Basque Nationalist Party [PNV] during the second half of 1986. The conclusions from this project will be supplemented throughout the year with other seasonal polls that will make it possible to study the variations in the pulse beat of Spanish society as 1987 elapses.

#### Affection, Time, and Money

To Spaniards as a whole, money and time are the major factors lacking. The lack of health and, in particular, of affection, is mentioned by clearly lesser percentages of individuals. Lack of money is cited as the main missing factor among the youngest (47 percent of those from 18 to 25 years of age); that of time, by those of medium age (49 percent of Spaniards from 26 to 35 years old); and that of health, by the oldest (43 percent of those over 60). The lack of affection proves to be a missing factor felt little in our society as a whole, although it proves to be the one most mentioned (31 percent) by one concrete, specific group of Spaniards: divorced men and women.

In this connection, it is interesting to compare the replies given to this question by Spanish women with those given 2 years ago, to a very similar question, by French women.

The data would appear to suggest that Spanish women, on the whole, fare somewhat worse with time, and somewhat better with affection and money, than do French women.

#### A Decade of Disenchantment Ends With 1986

A total of 70 percent of Spaniards are ready to embark on the new year with confidence, and only 10 percent claim to be doing so fearfully. This item of information, of itself alone, is perhaps the most telling indicator of the obvious recovery that seems to be taking place in Spaniards' outlook on life. In fact, at present we appear to be retrieving the levels present in 1976, with respect to interest and expectations for life, happiness and pride at the acknowledgment by others of their own accomplishments, and degree of personal fulfillment. During the final minutes of 1986, the combined overall index on outlook on life (which could range between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1) seems to stand at a level of 0.58 (compared with another of only 0.51 in 1980). In this same regard, there persists the fact that, at the end of 1986, 81 percent of Spaniards claim to be satisfied, as a whole, with the life that they are leading; a percentage that implies a clearcut gain over the levels for 1980, 1983, and 1984.

#### What They Would Tell the King to His Face

The image reflected by the king is highly positive, even cordial, transcending concrete political options. This is inferred from the high frequency of responses (nearly 80 percent), the minimal percentage of negative comments (2 percent), the content of the answers, and the tone in which they were voiced.

Confirming what has already been underscored by previous studies, the king appears to Spaniards as a kind of ultimate protector and savior on the highest echelon, who, nevertheless, inspires more feelings of relaxed, affectionate familiarity than intimidation, formal stiffness, or reverential fear.

#### In December We Spend Over Twice as Much as in Any Other Month

One out of every three Spaniards spends at Christmas twice as much, or more, than during the ordinary months of the year. And, although nearly everyone spends more during December, one out of every five of us spends more than twice the amount spent during the ordinary months.

One out of every two Spaniards (48 percent) spends over 10,000 pesetas on Christmas gifts, and one out of every five spends more than 20,000. As might be expected, the most money is spent on gifts in the wealthiest regions, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Madrid; and, within any type of region, in urban areas with over 100,000 inhabitants.

The "January crunch" constitutes a serious problem for one out of every 10 Spaniards, and a lesser one for 38 percent. The other half of the society does not seem to suffer from it, because the extra spending that they do in December does not create any economic problem for them during January. In some of the poorest regions (such as Andalucia, La Mancha, or the Canaries) this anxiety of the "January crunch" is reflected more often than in the others; which might, without doubt, be expected. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the problems relating to the "January crunch" show up with virtually the same frequency among individuals from the different social classes. Nor are there any significant differences among persons of varying ages. So, the tendency to spend beyond one's means appears to be distributed at random among the different social sectors; in other words, those who are most in debt do so in the same proportion although, of course, in keeping with the basic resources that they have.

The economic pessimism of the beginning of the decade began to be overcome during 1986. There is a growing feeling that both the national economy and the family economies are improving. The assessment of household economies improved 30 percent during the second half of 1986 alone. And, if we compare it with the situation 2 years ago, the positive assessment has increased 100 percent, or even more, depending on the indicator used (for example, the quotient between the optimistic and pessimistic view of personal economic futures multiplied over eight times between 1984 and 1986, and nearly twofold between the first and second halves of 1986).

The sectors which view their personal economic future most optimistically are, on the one hand, both private and public office employees, and, on the other, those who do not depend on salaries and wages on the intermediate level of society (free-lance professionals, and independent salespeople and workers). The optimism of the PSOE and PCE voters stands above average (40 percent), that of CP [Popular Coalition] voters is average, and that of the others is below average.

The assessment of the national economic situation is also more positive today than it was a few years ago, and its current trend is also upward, although the indicator tends to be removed from that on the family or personal situation. The state of the nation is usually viewed more negatively than that of one's own household.

The assessment made by PSOE voters of the national economy stands above the average in the same proportion by which that of CP voters stands below it (4-3 points); but there is far greater optimism regarding the future among the Socialist electorate (40 percent) than among the Popular Coalition group (20 percent), while the national average is 27 percent.

#### The Crises in PNV and AP Have Hurt the Governors' Image

All the available indicators reflect a certain amount of deterioration in the perception of the political situation, more than likely a result of the crises in the Popular Coalition and AP, as well as the political situation in the Basque Country (split in PNV, early elections, difficulties in forming a government). This deterioration is a result of the second half of 1986, as is clearly shown by the data related to the beginning and end of the year.

Not only is there a more negative assessment of the political situation in general, but there is also a worsening of the image of the governors as a whole (as a political group), and of the opinion on how they are handling public funds. Nevertheless, it should be explained that these shifts of opinion are taking place as part of a broader, more positive trend that was generated once the political crisis (the crisis in the system) of the years 1980-82 was surmounted, as is clearly shown on the trend charts since 1976.

The assessment of the political situation is far more positive among PSOE voters than among those of any other party. In any of the indicators used, the positive assessment is two or three times more frequent among the Socialist electorate than among those of CP, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], CiU [Convergence and Unity], or PNV, which do not differ from one another substantially in this respect.

The indicators on voting intention show the electorate in virtually the same positions as on the eve of last June's general elections, with the exception of the new distribution of the Basque Nationalist vote after the split in PNV, and a slight loss of support for AP (in direct indicators of voting intention, AP seldom exceeds 10 percent of the sample, more than half of the vote that it has actually received to date). The parties which, with AP, formed the Popular Coalition (PDP [Popular Democratic Party] and PL [Liberal Party]) receive very limited mention, and we have included them in the category of "others," wherein the combined voting intentions do not, at the moment, exceed the aggregate results of the other parties combined in the last general elections.

#### Prestige of the Church

Slowly but surely, throughout the 1980's, all the indicators assessing citizens' morale have moved in the direction of greater social and political integration.


Even in the indicator on religious sentiment, the low profile that religion and the Church have had during recent decades is beginning to rise. This society is becoming established within the new legal, political, and value-related system produced by all those changes, which was difficult to implant. In spite of everything, Spanish society appears to have a long way yet to go before it completes its integration in a modern and democratic manner. We continue to view ourselves as being rather disrespectful of authority and of ourselves, and far more demanding of our rights than obedient to the laws.

The civil society in Spain still appears weak with respect to the state, which it views from an interventionist, paternalistic standpoint. The changes in position are in the direction of retaining or even increasing dependence on the state. The data in comparison with the United States is quite enlightening. Whereas the least statism exists in the United States, Spain shows the highest degree of the society's association with the state.

In just 2 years, the opinion of those who would like to see public services expanded has increased by over 50 percent.


#### Technical Record

Executed by the Demoscopia Institute under the direction of sociologists Rafael Lopez Pintor and Jose Juan Toharia, full professors at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Poll of a sample of 1,200 persons over age 18, of both sexes, representative of the population residing on the peninsula, and in the Balearics and Canaries; with a confidence level of 95.5 percent, and an error of plus or minus 2.7 for overall data. Field work done between 12 and 18 December, through interviews at domiciles, with final selection of interviewees made by the random route system. Data processing in ODEC-Unitec.



Key to Chart 1:


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|--------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Outlook on Life | 7. Loneliness            |
| 2. Overall index   | 8. Isolation             |
| 3. Expectation     | 9. Boredom               |
| 4. Interest        | 10. Depression           |
| 5. Happiness       | 11. Personal fulfillment |
| 6. Pride           |                          |



Key to Chart 2:

1. If you could talk alone with the king now, what would you mention to him?
2. Solutions to unemployment, jobs
3. Safeguard the nation, take care of the government
4. Peace (keep it, defend it)
5. Greetings, congratulations
6. Praise for his action
7. Various personal requests
8. Heed for crime, drugs
9. Criticism of his action
10. I would not mention anything to him
11. Other greatly varied responses


## ECONOMÍA (1)



Key to Chart 3:

1. Economy
2. Very satisfied and rather satisfied with the life that they are leading
3. National economic situation is good or very good
4. The country's economic situation will be better within a year
5. Within a year, his or her personal economic situation will be better

## COYUNTURA (1)



Key to Chart 4:

1. Current Situation
2. The political situation is good or very good
3. The people governing Spain are prepared people
4. The government is managing well most of the money that we pay in taxes

Status of Voting Intentions

	Real vote June 86 (% census)	Express intention (% sample)	Intention plus sympathy (% sample)
CP	18.1	-	-
AP	-	8	10
CDS	6.4	6	8
PSOE	30.6	25	29
PC (IU)	3.2	3	4
CiU	3.4	3	3
PNV	1.0	0.8	0.8
EA	-	0.6	0.7
HB [Popular Unity]	0.7	0.7	0.7
EE [Basque Left]	0.3	0.8	1
Others	4.5	4	4
Blanks/nulls	2.1	2	2
Did not vote/does not vote	29.2	11	11
Don't know	-	15	6
No answer	-	19	20
	100	100	100

2909

CSO: 3548/36

**BUDGET FOR 1986 SHOWS SMALLER DEFICIT THAN EXPECTED****Figures on Budget**

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "...Deficit Reduced to 11 Percent of the GNP"]

[Text] A fine New Year's present for Budget Minister Guy Verhofstadt.

Nineteen hundred and eighty-six ended with a smaller deficit than expected in the state budget. Instead of the 567.5 billion estimated for Val-Duchesse, the coffers of the state revealed a "gap" of only 555.5 billion; that is, a gain of 12 billion. The reasons for this are not exactly clear; (there was of course a reduction in expected expenditures, but perhaps also a pickup in tax receipts at the end of the year).

Reduced to relative terms, that is, to a percentage of the gross national product (GNP), the deficit decreased from 12.5 percent in 1985 to 11.3 percent in 1986. But perhaps the gain will be shown to be even greater when the 1986 gross national product will have been calculated. Last year's GNP growth probably will not be 1.5 percent as expected, but actually 2 percent. With these figures, the 1986 deficit could amount to 10.8 percent. A good outcome perhaps; but, for all that, it must be said that the main things remains to be done. We have a record deficit in Europe; the principal reform is to occur in 1987 ("the year of truth," says Verhofstadt). The 1986 figure was greatly influenced by the very good international economic situation (lower oil prices and interest rates, almost no inflation, etc.). And a rise today of just about 1 percent in Belgian interest rates would be enough to make us wonder about the 1987 economic situation. Will this fine New Year's present last until Easter? That is the question.

Guy Verhofstadt believes that the 1986 outcome is due of course to the good economic situation, but also to the Val-Duchesse reduction in expenditures, which have already yielded 52 billion in savings in 1986, and above all to "vigilance 365 days a year and to strictness every minute of the day." On the basis of an unchanged policy and economic situation, let us recall that the 1986 deficit was expected to be 640 billion francs.

But, of course, after this present temporary favorable situation will come the rough time of budget control in February. This control was launched this past 29 December. Each department has been asked to submit its figures before 15 January. If a department requires additional loans for an item, it must prepare reports that will: (1) show that there will be no repetition of this request and (2) propose equivalent compensatory savings in other areas. It is easy to recognize in this the budgetary watchdog course of Guy Verhofstadt. This budgetary control is announced each time as a delicate political event. But this time the government at least will have the advantage of starting without any bad 1986 surprise.

#### Flemish Socialists' Criticisms

Brussels LE SOIR in French 9 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by D. Dt.: The SP Accuse the Government of Presenting a Budgetary Show and a Community Smoke Screen"]

[Text] The role of the opposition most certainly is to oppose. And the SP always carries out this function with spirit. But, included in the new elements advanced by the "chief opposition party according to the number of votes," emphasizes Karel Van Miert, are some elements that somewhat temper the exaggerated confidence shown by Minister of the Budget Guy Verhofstadt.

The latter took pleasure Thursday in emphasizing that the 1986 budgetary deficit was smaller by 12 billion than what initially had been expected. And he attributed this result partially to Val-Duchesse. Flemish Socialists dispute both the figure and the reasons for it.

Freddy Willockx believes, on the other hand, that the agreement made with the banks this past August signifies an elimination from the budget of some 8 billion in interest charges.

In short, in the opinion of the SP, the exaggerated confidence of Verhofstadt is not credible. All the more so, recalls Willockx, since his party had declared as far back as this past May that the very favorable development of the economic situation (oil prices, interest rates, inflation, etc.) would automatically reduce the 1986 deficit to below that of 1985, without its being necessary to proceed to the Val-Duchesse reforms to accomplish this. And he concludes that it is a question of a "governmental show." On the other hand, the estimates of the SP regarding the 1987 budget are much more pessimistic. The Flemish Socialists believe that the Val-Duchesse objective, that is, a deficit of 417.8 billion, will not be reached and that it finally could be short by 30 to 35 billion francs; because, in the opinion of the SP, the government underestimated the matter of unemployment when it placed the increase in the number of unemployed workers in 1987 at only 18,000. On the other hand, several economic measures remain problematical (the economy of the SNCB [Belgian National Railroads], the Postal Service, the INAMI [National Institute for Illness and Disability Insurance], etc.).

### "A Missed Opportunity"

Former Minister Willy Claes speaks in the aggregate of a "missed opportunity." The 1986 exceptional international context did not make it possible to basically improve our economic outcome or to reduce unemployment. Using some European statistics, the SP estimates that, from October 1985 to October 1986, unemployment increased at home 1.2 percent, while it decreased 5.7 percent in Germany and 6.3 percent in the Netherlands.

The Flemish Socialists also struck hard at what they term the injustices of the Martens VI policy, which "creates additional discriminations among the people." "With respect to education, for example," explains Karel Van Miert, "ideas of an elite system are being re-introduced. There is talk of a 'numerus clausus' [a limited group], a very anti-liberal concept." Willy Claes regrets the absence of an industrial policy and the vagueness of the energy policy. In the name of his party, he asks for the speedy holding of another discussion on energy. Claes brought out incoherences between Verhofstadt, who withholds research loans for new forms of energy, and Maystadt who, on the contrary, argues for them.

Referring to the community, Van Miert spoke of a smoke screen. In his opinion, the agreement on Brussels that was made in Saint-Sylvestre is no more than a bad falsification, devised for the purpose of granting inheritance taxes to Brussels. "The government has simply tried to avoid coming in contact with a possible slippery situation [literally, a banana peel], without getting to the bottom of the problem. The true aim of the agreement is to make it possible for the four parties of the majority to split Brussels' profits among themselves by governing together the agglomeration and the communes."

Willy Claes, of Limburg, of course spoke again of the matter of the mines. The Gheyselinck plan in his opinion is a purely political plan. The manager of the coal mines was not able to do anything but yield to the political constraints of the March 1984 law on the de facto decentralization of the national sectors. According to the former minister, it by no means was a question of an economic and social plan. Furthermore, he repeated that there had been far too little money provided to ensure the reconversion of the economy of the province.

This press conference at the time of the reassembly of the SP indicates, said Karel Van Miert, that the Flemish Socialists will continue again this year to badger the government. It must be said that, for them, time is beginning to drag. The Socialists have been excluded from power for 5 years. And the recent "regulations" introduced by the government seem to ward off any prospect of a reversal of alliances.

8255

CSO: 3619/20

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH CSSR--The administrative council of the Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives Unions signed a cooperation protocol with Czechoslovak Union of Cooperative Farmers today. The signing ceremony was attended by Czechoslovak Ambassador in Athens Jozef Nalepka and by members of the central Czechoslovak cooperatives organization led by Pavol Jonas, chairman of the Czechoslovak Union of Cooperative Farmers and member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. [Text] [Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1900 GMT 19 Jan 87 NC] /8309

CSO: 3521/67

## ATTITUDES SHIFTING ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, ALLIED BASING

Bielefeld EMNID INFORMATIONEN in German No 8/9, 1986 pp 9-12

[Opinion surveys conducted by EMNID-Institut GmbH & Co., Bielefeld, dates indicated below]

[Text] Sympathy for Conscientious Objectors High

An increasing number of West German citizens feel that conscientious objection to military service is a position that should be recognized and respected.

West Germans were again asked to give their opinion on this issue in a representative opinion poll that repeated previous surveys.

The question was presented as follows:

"What is your basic attitude toward the question of refusing to serve in the military? Do you feel that refusing military service is a position that must be disapproved of, in West Germany's present situation, or do you believe that such refusals for reasons of conscience should be recognized or respected?"

Sympathy for conscientious objectors was found to have continued its increase of the past 30 years. Eight out of 10 of those polled felt that this position should be accepted, and only one in five disapproved of it.

Opinion	1956 %	1978 %	1986 %
<b>Refusals to serve in the military:</b>			
Should be disapproved of	31	29	21
By conscientious objectors should be recognized and respected	64	66	79
No response	5	4	0
Total	100%	100%	100%

The number of those polled who disapproved of refusing military service varied with age: this attitude was voiced more often by older people than by younger ones. In terms of education, there was a sharp cut-off beginning at the respondents with a junior high school education. These respondents and those with a college and/or high school education tended more toward the opinion that conscientious objection should be recognized.

Opinion	Age					Education		
	14-19 years	20-29 years	30-49 years	50-64 years	65+ years	Grade school	Junior high school	High school/ college
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Refusals to serve in the military:</b>								
Should be dis- approved of	15	17	18	21	38	27	14	11
By conscientious objectors should be recognized and respected	85	83	82	79	62	73	86	89
No response	-	0	-	-	0	0	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Relatively few of those opposing conscientious objection were also CDU/CSU supporters, while 91 percent of Green Party sympathizers were in favor of recognizing conscientious objection to military service.

(The latest representative poll of approximately 1,061 West German citizens aged 14 and older was conducted from 10 July to 21 July 1986.)

#### Allied Troops in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Unavoidable Necessity

The American, British and French troops that have been stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany for more than 41 years are viewed as an unavoidable necessity by nearly one in every two West German citizens. One-third consider their presence to be welcome protection, while 17 percent of those polled see it as an undesirable burden.

This is the result of a repeated trend survey, on which there are comparative data dating back to the early 1950's, conducted by EMNID-Institut during August 1986:

"Do you feel that the allied troops currently stationed in West Germany are primarily a welcome means of protection, an unavoidable necessity, or an undesirable burden?"

Opinion	1952 %	1956 %	1960 %	1974 %	1977 %	1981 %	1986 %
Welcome protection	14	11	23	30	36	44	34
Unavoidable necessity	34	45	54	48	47	42	48
Undesirable burden	33	38	18	11	14	12	17
No response	19	6	5	11	3	2	1

The number of those unreservedly in favor of the stationing of allied troops in the Federal Republic of Germany, which reached its peak to date in the 1981 survey, has dropped back slightly to only about one in three of those polled. However, the overall trend makes it clear that generally the occupying forces, which many once considered undesirable, are increasingly being seen as partners in defense, with their presence now viewed as welcome protection or at least an unavoidable necessity by 80 percent of the population.

Opinions on the stationing of allied troops in the Federal Republic of Germany varied sharply with the age of those polled. While the younger respondents predominantly disapproved of the presence of allied troops, a fair percentage of the older population--especially those in the 50-64 age group--considered it to be necessary or a welcome means of protection:

Opinion	Age group				
	14-19 years	20-29 years	30-49 years	50-64 years	65+ years
Welcome protection	21	27	30	50	32
Unavoidable necessity	55	40	54	37	62
Undesirable burden	23	33	16	11	5
No response	1	0	0	2	1

The survey also asked how people felt about the behavior of the allied troops. The opinion, in response to the question:

"And do you consider the behavior of these soldiers toward the German public to be very good, good, fair or poor?"

was generally quite positive, as it had been in the previous surveys:

Opinion	1952 %	1956 %	1958 %	1959 %	1960 %	1974 %	1977 %	1986 %
Very good	7	3	6	8	5	7	8	8
Good	34	31	42	52	49	47	61	58
Fair	25	40	35	28	29	24	23	29
Poor	9	17	8	6	6	4	3	3
No response	25	9	9	6	11	18	6	2

13114/6091  
CSO: 3620/102

MILITARY

FRANCE

GIRAUD, DASSAULT CONFLICT TOUCHES MIRAGE-2000, RAFALE

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 86 p 8

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense waited until the end of the year before giving the Dassault-Breguet Group an order for the 35 Mirage-2000 fighter planes that Parliament had authorized the French Air Force to purchase out of its 1986 budget. For its part, the manufacturer is threatening to suspend flights by its Rafale prototype by Christmas if new arrangements are not made between the state and the French aeronautics industry for the joint financing of those tests.

Although each of the partners denies it, the prevailing impression is that a muffled minor war has been going on between the ministry and its chief industrialist in the field of military aeronautics since the death of Marcel Dassault last April and the election at the end of October of his son, Serge Dassault, to head the group. It is no secret from anyone that Minister of Defense Andre Giraud long combated--in vain--the solution being advocated by Serge Dassault in order to take direct control of his father's company.

Since then, almost all of Dassault-Breguet's officials have shared the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that the Ministry of Defense is equivocating a great deal before reaching any decisions affecting the group's future. To use the expression employed by a top executive in the firm's general management, it is as though the ministry were "making the company pay" for the determination of its current owners to remain independent of the state--their banker and customer.

Time To Reflect

The firm had to wait until last 28 November for notification that France was officially ordering 18 Mirage-2000 single-seat air defense planes, 1 Mirage-2000 two-seat trainer for air defense, and 16 Mirage-2000-N's (capable of firing nuclear missiles) for low-altitude penetration. The contract had been authorized by Parliament at the end of 1985 as the 1986 credits for the French Air Force were being approved. Notification of the order was announced by the manufacturer on Tuesday, 16 December.

France's contract to purchase those 35 Mirage-2000's comes at just the right time for Dassault-Breguet, whose success with exports in 1986 will be a long way from living up to management's hopes. Nine Mirage-2000's and one Alpha-Jet attack aircraft have been ordered from abroad to date. Over a 10-year period, French and foreign orders have averaged as many as 75 aircraft per year. So 1986, which is just ending, is likely to be different from preceding years.

At the Ministry of Defense, it is claimed that there was no delay with the French order due to "bad humor." It is added that in the area in question, contracts are generally finalized in the fall of each year. Dassault-Breguet tells a different story. It says the opposite: that in comparison with the rules followed in past years, administrative negotiations were "deliberately" delayed by 2 months--to the point that the Air Force was becoming worried.

The same lack of harmony between the two partners is noted in connection with the fate of the Rafale--the prototype that is supposed to form the basis for defining the new fighter plane to be used by both the French Air Force and the French Naval Air Force. Five months after its first flight, the demonstration aircraft has managed to maintain an average of 16 test flights per month in the hands of eight different pilots. That is a record, according to Dassault.

#### Limited Self-Financing

The minister of defense wants to take the time to reflect on the future of a program that will require total financing amounting to 130 billion francs (spread over several years) for about 330 aircraft if ordered under present conditions. Do we need a Rafale as presently designed? Or, on the contrary, should its characteristics and performance be redefined? In the meantime, should we modernize the equipment on the Mirage-2000's for the Air Force and then, if necessary, equip those planes with the M-88 jet engine originally intended for the Rafale and, in that case, have the Naval Air Force procure American F-18's? The future of French aeronautics depends on all those very complex questions.

The Dassault-Breguet Group, on the other hand, being satisfied with its Rafale, is in a greater hurry to get the ministry's green light during the first quarter of 1987. It is demanding that the state make the decision as soon as possible to begin planning and developing a series aircraft based on the prototype, fearing that it will arrive on the market too late to meet the competition.

To put pressure on the government--or because it really is up against financial difficulties that are also forcing it to give early retirement to 700 of its wage earners--the company is threatening to suspend test flights with the Rafale on Christmas, saying that it can no longer afford the cost.

As a general rule, the cost of testing is shared by the state and all the firms involved in a project. For example, one of the seven prototypes required for refining the Mirage-2000 project was financed completely by the Dassault-Breguet Group. In the case of the Rafale, half the financing is

being provided by the state. By threatening to stop providing its share as stipulated by the agreed terms, the manufacturer is emphasizing that its self-financing capability with respect to the Rafale tests is not unlimited, precisely because of its management difficulties related to the current slump in sales.

That is why the firm is expecting the state to grant it reimbursable advances out of public funds. Alternatively, it wants the Ministry of Defense to assume gradual responsibility--over the next 4 years--for self-financing which is now the responsibility of the firms involved, in which case their responsibility for self-financing would decline over the same period. The manufacturers would then make up for it out of their export earnings. But if that solution is chosen, it will require that the Rafale program be started quickly so that the aircraft can be offered to international customers. That explains the Dassault-Breguet Group's persistence in opposition to Giraud, who wants the best aircraft possible.

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CSO: 3519/52

MILITARY

FRANCE

ISNARD VIEWS PROS, CONS OF AWACS PURCHASE

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] For 4 years now, the Air Force General Staff has been urging the French Government to order what it discreetly calls an "airborne detection system"--that is, a system capable of detecting low-altitude aggression from the air (by aircraft or cruise missiles) while in flight over the national territory and in operations abroad. At present, such attacks cannot be monitored by ground radars.

Several systems based on existing or planned foreign or French aircraft have been evaluated. On the one hand, the French Air Force has studied Grumman's E-2C aircraft, Boeing's E-3A AWACS plane, Lockheed's Orion P-3C, and British Aerospace's Nimrod AEW, which, paradoxically, was being demonstrated at the Mont-de-Marsan Base (in Landes) the very day before the British chose the AWACS. On the other hand, the French Air Force has considered the possibility of installing low-altitude detection equipment on the airframes of such French aircraft as the Atlantique, the Transall, or the Airbus.

In 1985, a committee at the Ministry of Defense reported its technical conclusions and opted for procurement of the AWACS plane in the United States. The Air Force General Staff having estimated that it would require at least three aircraft, the cost of the program is estimated at about 8 billion francs, part of which might be offset if some of the workload is assigned to France by the American manufacturer.

Without prejudicing its own choice, which may be dictated by nontechnical considerations, Jacques Chirac's government led Parliament to include a sum of 525 million francs (in payment credits) and a commitment of 4 billion francs (in program authorizations) in the 1987 defense budget in case the decision to order an "airborne detection system" is eventually made.

A joint order by France and Great Britain (since the latter's decision in principle is now known) is one possibility often put forward by those favoring the AWACS, the purpose being to induce Boeing to grant its two customers better contract terms. But the aircraft ought to be the same on both sides of

the English Channel so that France and the United Kingdom can buy the aircraft at a series price and then obtain better terms for its maintenance.

#### No Consensus in Armed Forces

Actually, the thing that is causing debate in France and probably leading the Ministry of Defense to continue thinking about the matter is the fact that complete and decisive consensus in favor of the AWACS does not exist among the French services--except, of course, within the lobby that has come to exist by force of circumstance within the Air Force's Air Defense Command. The fact is that outside the Air Defense Command, there are French pilots who admit that they are not convinced of the value of buying AWACS planes for France.

For example, it is noted by members of staffs other than the air defense staff that since France is not in the front line in northern or central Europe, it is covered--that is, protected from air attacks from the East--by the electronic barrier already constituted by the 18 NATO AWACS radar planes based in the FRG and the 6 AWACS planes that Boeing will begin delivering to the British Air Force after 1991. As it already does with NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment] (the ground-based air detection network used by the Allies in Europe), France could therefore contract to receive information collected by the "electronic Maginot Line" formed by NATO's and Great Britain's AWACS planes, even though that system is permeable and vulnerable.

On the other hand, France has detection requirements of its own in the Mediterranean, in its overseas territories and departments, and in Africa--that is, in areas where it can act on its own behalf and, if need be, on behalf of its allies.

In those circumstances, AWACS is probably a very costly system to buy and an expensive one to operate. A plane such as Grumman's Hawkeye E-2C is probably more suitable (the U.S. Navy Air Force and Israel use it to good advantage). It can be based on the next French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. But now that London has made its decision, Boeing's supporters in France, especially in the Air Defense Command, will make purchase of the AWACS a matter of prestige even though other investments are more urgent.

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CSO: 3519/52

## MLRS UNITS ENTER SERVICE WITH I CORPS ARTILLERY

The Hague ALLE HENS in Dutch Dec 86 pp 20-21

[Article by J. R. Gramsma: "Revolutionary Artillery for I Army Corps"]

[Text] "The soldier's system" is how the manufacturer, Vought Corporation, describes the Royal Army's newest acquisition: the MLRS. This abbreviation stands for Multiple Launch Rocket System. The manufacturer's brochure promises a great deal more: automatic, independent fire control; great mobility; high rate of fire; fast reloading; easy operation; and fire power said to be as great as that of an entire battery of 155 mm howitzers. Experience in the American Army shows that the manufacturer is speaking only the truth. Reason enough to take a closer look at this remarkable weapon system.

The MLRS consists of the chassis of a Bradley combat vehicle on which is mounted a holder with twice six rockets. The rockets can be fired singly or in salvos; a salvo can be gotten off in less than a minute, by the way. Depending on the kind of munition, the weapon system has a range of 30-40 km. The launcher has its own loading system, which can reload in a short time. Each MLRS is accompanied by two 10-ton trucks, each with a self-loading crane and each able to carry four containers. The weapons system is very mobile and can get into position remarkably fast. The MLRS waits in concealment for the command to fire. When it gets the command, it proceeds to its launch position, fires its rockets, and disappears to find another hiding place in order to reload. This makes it very difficult for enemy artillery to detect the system and destroy it.

The rocket, almost 4 meters long and weighing a good 300 kg, has a solid fuel propellant and can carry various kinds of munitions. The submunitions are released 300 meters above the target. There are three kinds of submunitions. First is the "ICM dual purpose." This "improved conventional munition" consists of a total of 644 small shells. These small shells, comparable to hand grenades, have a splinter effect as well as a hollow charge. This makes them very effective against dismounted infantry, truck columns, distribution points, and lightly armored vehicles. The second type of submunition, the antitank mine, is almost ready for mass production. In this version, the rocket releases 28 antitank mines above the enemy target. These mines are capable of destroying any known tank. The third type of submunition is still

under development and is not expected to be operational until after 1995. It consists of small rockets which are released and then stabilized with a parachute, after which the warhead scans the target area for "hard" targets like tanks. Each main rocket can carry six of these small ones; a single MLRS can therefore put 72 of these projectiles over a tank concentration. A rocket launcher cannot achieve the big "boom" that comes from the explosion of an ordinary iron high explosive shell. Nor would that serve any purpose, because the many small shells are certainly just as effective against surface targets, while the MLRS is far too inaccurate to destroy, for instance, a command post in a house (against which a high-explosive shell is very effective). That demands the precision of a howitzer.

#### Revolutionary Fire Control

The Netherlands is buying 22 launchers. Four of them will be used for training and in reserve. The other 18 will be divided into 2 batteries of 9 launchers each. The batteries are intended for I Army Corps and will be "shared out" to the field artillery groups. The Netherlands is thus being rather stingy compared to some of the allies that are also introducing the system (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany). The Americans, for instance, have a section, consisting of 3 batteries with a total of 27 launchers, at division level, while at the same level the Germans have a section consisting of 2 MLRS batteries and 1 LARS-II battery. One of the Royal Army's batteries will be an active-duty unit, while the other will be a reserve unit. An MLRS battery consists of the battery staff and three platoons with three launchers each. The platoons operate together as a battery but are widely scattered on the ground. This is made possible by the modern electronics aboard the MLRS.

#### Its Own Navigation System

Each rocket launcher can operate completely independently. The crew (a battery sergeant, a corporal to drive it, and a gunner) has its own fire control computer, which calculates firing data and aims the weapon system entirely automatically. An artilleryman needs certain essential data in order to hit his target, which after all he himself cannot see. He must know exactly where he is, precisely where his shots are supposed to come down, and what kind of target he is shooting against. The ballistic data for the type of rocket in the launcher are necessary too, of course, as is a (computerized) meteorological report. The MLRS is no longer dependent on the old, often difficult and time-consuming methods to determine its own position. Each launcher has a navigational system on board which functions roughly in the same way as a jet's inertial navigational system. In order to maintain the necessary degree of accuracy, about every 8 km the system has to be compared with the coordinates of a point--such as an intersection--that is indicated on a map and whose location is known precisely. That can be done very simply by driving over it and then "updaten" the system, as it is called in Netherlands military jargon.

An MLRS battery has yet another way to verify its position: each battery includes a Landrover with special navigational equipment on board. This can go for a drive on its own, so that the rocket launchers can stay in

concealment. Consideration is also being given to providing such PERBA (position and direction determination equipment) teams to other field artillery sections. Although technical fire control is carried out in the rocket launcher itself, tactical fire control is carried out at battery level. Here the American equipment has been replaced by the Netherlands VERDAC system from the Hollandse Signaal company. At present the American software is being adapted to the Netherlands system. This will ensure that the MLRS units too are integrated into I Corps artillery's automatic fire support role.

The MLRS represents an enormous change compared to current artillery weapons. Just the fact that it is totally dependent on electronics and cannot even be aimed manually takes a lot of getting used to for many artillermen. However, the MLRS is a welcome addition. Given the effectiveness of its fire and its great range, it is particularly suited for support in depth. Use against ground weapon systems is the second priority. Enemy artillery, mortars, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft artillery will certainly be worthwhile targets for the MLRS. By taking on these tasks, the MLRS frees guns for the other important mission of the artillery: providing close support to the units in the front line. The ability to attack second echelon units depends entirely on the ability to detect them. In part because the acquisition of the MLRS was brought forward ahead of schedule, I Corps' present resources for that task are not optimal. To be sure, the army possesses mortar detection radar, but I Corps primarily has to use air force (reconnaissance) flights in order to look further behind the front.

A study is currently being made to determine whether RPV's might solve the army's problem; these are small unmanned aircraft that use TV cameras and other sensors to provide "live" pictures of enemy positions and troop movements.

#### Savings

The 22 multiple rocket launchers will cost the army 840 million guilders (about two thirds of that sum is earmarked for munitions). That is a lot of money, but the introduction of the rocket launchers makes it possible to eliminate three reserve sections with towed 155 mm guns, without loss of firepower. In addition, the remaining sections with towed 155 mm guns will be thoroughly modernized. These two measures will produce large savings in personnel and operating costs, so that the MLRS also justifies Vought's final claim: "value for money."

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CSO: 3614/28

## INCREASED DEFENSE EFFORT IN VULNERABLE NORRLAND ANALYZED

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 3 Jan 87 p 10

[Article by Volker Skierka: "To Stockholm for Caviar: After Many Unannounced Submarine Visits, Sweden Is Strengthening Its Defense"]

[Text] We are flying in a light combat aircraft of the type SK 60 in the direction of Kiruna in the northern part of the country. The flight altitude ranges between 200 and 600 meters. Under us extend seemingly endless forests, swampy marshland, a great deal of water, few roads and a sparse population. Near Jokkmokk, the town on the Arctic Circle that serves as a cultural center for the Lapps, a large reindeer drive is now under way. After just under 1 hour of flight time, the aircraft of the Swedish Air Force crosses the large ore mines of Kiruna and follows the railroad between the steeply rising mountains toward dark snow clouds in the direction of Narvik in Norway. Again and again, we see hills that have been developed into a ramified system of underground bunkers. They are part of the defense planning of the government of the neutral Sweden that has been strengthened for this region.

A year ago, in a speech to the Institute for Foreign Policy in Stockholm, Olof Palme, the Swedish prime minister who was murdered in February, pointed out that "the northern European and North Atlantic area has attained greater strategic importance in the international trial of strength of the two military blocs NATO and Warsaw Pact." An "increasing military activity by both military blocs is ascertainable in the areas near our borders." In our flight over Norrland, the pilot points out that the Soviet military port of Murmansk, which the Soviet Union has meanwhile developed into the world's largest military base, is only 600 kilometers from the Swedish air force base in Lule, whereas it is 750 kilometers to Stockholm. The Soviet Union has two-thirds of its up-to-date nuclear submarines stationed at the military complex on Kola Peninsula, which is always free of ice on account of the Gulf Stream that flows by there. Another large port facility is now being built to the east of Murmansk.

The Kola Peninsula and the European north are strategically important for the Soviet Union not only because this is the shortest distance to the economic centers of the United States but also because the main lines of the transatlantic traffic routes of NATO cross the North Atlantic. In addition, only from these latitudes does the Soviet Union have free access to the

Atlantic. The increasing geostrategic importance of northern Europe was also apparent most recently in the NATO fall maneuver "Northern Wedding," which took place in the North Atlantic as well as the North Sea and Baltic and is considered the largest of its kind to date.

The Swedes fear that their country would simply be in the way in the event of a military conflict between East and West and would be annexed by one of the major powers as a military assembly and march-through area. The region could be a temptation in a conflict: for the one side, to establish operational bases against the NATO member Norway and NATO movements in the North Atlantic and, for the other side, to hinder the Soviet Union in doing this. From here, on the other hand, it would be possible to operate against targets in the Soviet Union. In general, a glance at the map shows that in an emergency Sweden represents an obstacle for military planners on both sides.

An additional problem for the Soviet Union is the narrow passage from the Baltic Sea to the North Atlantic, past Sweden and the NATO countries Denmark and Norway. The continuous submarine activities in the Baltic and the penetration of foreign, apparently Soviet, submarines into Swedish territorial waters allow the assumption that possible bases are being scouted for the state of emergency. The fissured Swedish coast with its many small islands and underwater trenches would offer suitable hiding places. "Swedish territory could encourage one side or the other to utilize it as a shortcut for air operations, as a transit area, as a base primarily for air forces, or as an advanced air control post," states a report by the Defense Committee in parliament.

With this background, the ruling Social Democratic Workers Party and the conservation opposition in the Swedish parliament have sought in past weeks to reach agreement on the defense budget to be passed in January as well as on the new 5-year plan that is expected to be put to a vote in March. With about 23.5 billion kronor (about DM7.5 billion), the defense budget currently accounts for about 8 percent of the total budget and corresponds to 3 percent of the gross national product. To be sure, all of the parties agree that more money needs to be spent for defense; this is required by the increasing geostrategic importance of the north, the increasing penetration of foreign submarines into Swedish waters, and the inability of the navy to prevent this or to capture the intruders. Through Christmas time, however, there were some differences about the magnitude of the rate of increase.

Whereas the Social Democrats wanted to put a maximum of an additional 1 billion kronor, or at most about 4 percent, into national defense, the conservatives demanded an increase of between 1.5 billion and 2 billion kronor. Accordingly, the expenditure in the next 5 years should rise to a maximum of 117 billion or 125 billion kronor, respectively. All are in agreement that the main effort of the Swedish defense policy in the coming years will be the improvement of air defense and coastal defense through the navy. In the Ministry of Defense, it is hoped that the new multipurpose combat aircraft JAS 39 Gripen will go into series production as early as next year. It is said that the equivalent of DM15 billion have been invested in its development.

The future armament of new aircraft was a matter of dispute in past weeks. Whereas there were those--primarily on the side of the Social Democrats--who were in favor of the development of Sweden's own missiles with a radar searcher, there were proponents of the purchase of American Amraam missiles in the camp of the conservatives and the military. Because it is costly, the highly developed weapons technology makes it more and more difficult for small neutral countries to finance their own developments. Nevertheless, about 70 percent of Swedish military equipment is produced domestically. Sweden also exports its own military technology, which continually leads to political controversies, however.

The development of a "Snow Cat" seems to be "taking off." This is a caterpillar vehicle made of plastic and rubber with a trailer that can transport a detachment of soldiers through almost any kind of terrain, whether it be snow, rock or swamp and even over extremely steep grades. For cost reasons, as one learns from the Ministry of Defense, Sweden is striving for cooperation with firms in other European countries, primarily in the area of high technology. The discussion of the increase in defense costs is also increasingly occurring under the pressure of the question: "How much can our independence be worth to us?"

A new consciousness in defense policy seems to have been forming in Swedish politics after the Defense Committee of parliament was cautiously critical of the reduction in qualified armed forces units in a 1984 report. In particular with the background of the foreign submarine activities, experts are observing that the once highly valued efficiency of the Swedish Navy was reduced during the 1970's, the time of the policy of detente, through political decisions. Moscow has used this to its advantage. Through tape recordings of the engine noises of foreign submarines and not least after the incident at Karlskrona on the south Swedish coast, where in 1961 a Soviet nuclear submarine of the Whiskey Class (NATO designation) ran aground and then had to surface, it is assumed that the intruders are mainly of Soviet origin.

To be sure, the navy swarmed out repeatedly for submarine hunts and tried to force the unknown underwater vessels to surface by dropping water bombs but it was all in vain. Once an old refrigerator was hit and then they found signs of minisubmarines and underwater mopeds with which divers from mother submarines had fanned out. In addition, soldiers on an island near the secret Swedish naval base of Muskoe followed a mysterious diver all the way across the island until he disappeared unidentified in the water. But no one and nothing was caught.

That was not only embarrassing, because the Swedes thus made themselves more and more the laughingstock of the world public. In addition, there is a growing fear among experts that no one is any longer taking seriously the Swedish policy of a defensive neutrality. Meanwhile, there is also the concern in Sweden that NATO could get the idea of following the Soviet example and reconnoitering Swedish sovereign territory under water itself. Periscopes peeping out of the water are especially frequent in the summer months. The navy sometimes receives as many as 40 reports a month from civilians. According to the navy's annual report, foreign submarines penetrated Swedish territorial waters at least 15 times last year. Once, a few years ago, a

submarine is even supposed to have sought a way to the port of the Swedish capital through the "Skerries Garden," as the archipelago of countless islands in front of Stockholm is called.

Swedish military people relate operations of this kind with small submarines to intelligence on the so-called "Spetsnats" units of the Soviet Army. These are small sabotage units that are trained to infiltrate the country by means of parachute or minisubmarine and purposefully cripple the infrastructure. According to the Swedish Ministry of Defense, these soldiers speaking perfect Swedish have the task of neutralizing communications centers and administrative control points as unexpectedly and quietly as possible and of killing key figures. The "Spetsnats" units act as a vanguard for follow-up occupation forces.

The weakened defensive readiness of the military most recently observed after the Palme murder in February 1986, which could be put in a state of alert only with difficulty, has made obvious the necessity of increased efforts. Defense expenditures had declined noticeably in recent years. Entire garrisons and naval units were deactivated. Today Sweden's armed forces are made up of 18,000 career servicemen, mainly officers, and 50,000 draftees who must complete between 7.5 and 15 months of basic military service and later five repeat maneuvers. Compulsory military service is in effect from age 18 to age 47. Women can perform voluntary military service. In addition, there are about 23,000 civil servants and 12,000 reserve officers. In case of a mobilization, almost 800,000 men, that is, about 10 percent of the population, can be mobilized within 3 to 4 days.

The fact that the defense of the country below the threshold of a nuclear war would be no easy task for the Swedes was made clear by the round flight over the Norrland region, which makes up 37 percent of the total area of Sweden and is as large as the FRG, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Only about 6 percent of the Swedish population of just 8.3 million lives here. But even if the lonely country therefore seems to be easily conquerable, the Swedes have nonetheless developed a concept in recent years that makes them think that an aggressor would not get far.

There are, for one thing, the natural conditions: winter prevails almost half of the year up here on the Arctic Circle. Snow falls between September and May and the snow cover is usually deep between November and May. But even though temperatures are often as low as minus 40 degrees, the insulating snow cover means that the swamp areas seldom freeze solid enough to make them easily passable, according to Lars Englund, commander of the Norrland armed forces and chief of staff of the Swedish Army. The echeloned defense concept provides that small units will impede the advance and survival of the invaders. Operating from underground bunkers, they would destroy roads, bridges and railroad tracks at prepared sites. In extreme cases, they would even destroy dams, that is, pursue a form of guerilla tactics. Moreover, everywhere there are hidden airfields for the few combat aircraft, currently still the Viggens.

Even though above all the air force is now suffering under the problems of the exodus to private industry because of excessively low pay (which led to a

radical increase in the pay of pilots), after the airplane tour, Major General Englund is eager to make it clear that Sweden is now awake. The country does not want to be reexposed to the torment that toy stores are offering such games as the one dealing with a submarine in Skerries Garden. In this amusing family pastime, a Soviet submarine admiral runs out of caviar and sends his submarine to Sweden to obtain a fresh supply. The winner is the one who first makes fast next to the fine "Opern-Keller" on the waterfront in Stockholm, procures caviar there and brings it to Kaliningrad despite all attempts of the Swedish Navy to catch him. One always gets through--in the game anyway.

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CSO: 3620/108

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